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Abstract
The current financial crisis resonates with every American, regardless of their connection to
the securities markets. Many struggle to understand how and why the American financial and se-
curities markets collapsed last year. In essence, why did the regulators fail to prevent the collapse?
Government officials continue to analyze the relationship between the structural collapse of the
markets and regulators’ limited jurisdiction over a class of entities whose transactions substan-
tially impact the markets: hedge funds. Congress can no longer deny hedge funds’ detrimental
impact on the financial and securities markets. The impetus for financial re-regulation has arrived.
It is incumbent upon Congress to enact laws which extend the jurisdiction of federal regulators to
hedge funds. At a minimum, such supervision is necessary to protect the investing public. The
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elusiveness of hedge funds and their investment strategies is of particular concern. Federal regu-
lation may take the form of a registration requirement. Perhaps publicly-traded companies should
disclose their transactions with hedge funds. More comprehensive regulatory reform options in-
clude the creation of a hybrid regulatory hedge fund governance matrix based upon the dollar
volume, frequency of trades and potential losses that hedge funds may experience. It is incumbent
upon Congress to create the proper balance between protecting the investing public and main-
taining sustainable American financial and securities markets, which in turn stabilizes the global
economy.
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AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
Today we shall have come through a period of loose thinking,
descending morals, an era of selfishness, of individual men and
women and of whole nations. Blame not government alone for this.
Blame ourselves in equal share ....
-President Franklin Delano Roosevelt'
ABSTRACT
The current financial crisis resonates with every American,
regardless of their connection to the securities markets. Many
struggle to understand how and why the American financial and
securities markets collapsed last year. In essence, why did the
regulators fail to prevent the collapse? Government officials
continue to analyze the relationship between the structural collapse
of the markets and regulators' limited jurisdiction over a class of
entities whose transactions substantially impact the markets: hedge
funds. Congress can no longer deny hedge funds' detrimental
impact on the financial and securities markets. The impetus for
financial re-regulation has arrived. It is incumbent upon Congress to
enact laws which extend the jurisdiction of federal regulators to
hedge funds. At a minimum, such supervision is necessary to protect
the investing public.
The elusiveness of hedge funds and their investment strategies is of
particular concern. Federal regulation may take the form of a
registration requirement. Perhaps publicly-traded companies should
disclose their transactions with hedge funds. More comprehensive
regulatory reform options include the creation of a hybrid regulatory
hedge fund governance matrix based upon the dollar volume,
frequency of trades and potential losses that hedge funds may
experience. It is incumbent upon Congress to create the proper
balance between protecting the investing public and maintaining
sustainable American financial and securities markets, which in turn
stabilizes the global economy.
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Roosevelt's Nomination Address, Chicago, III. (July 2,
1932) (transcript available at http://newdeal.feri.org/speeches/1932b.htm) [hereinafter
Roosevelt Address].
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INTRODUCTION
He that is of opinion money will do everything may well be suspected of doing
everything for money.
-Benjamin Franklin 2
The red light on my office phone flashed incessantly, demanding
attention. I ignored it. My small, government issued office, courtesy of
New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, would seem to the
casual observer the epitome of efficiency; no space was left unused.
Each square inch of the office had documents appropriately labeled,
categorized, read and re-read. Ah, the duty to read. The fiduciary duty
to read, established by the court in Francis v. New Jersey Bank,3
remained with me years after my corporations class. I read and re-read
everything.
My attention was pulled back to the flashing red light on my phone.
I wondered if that strange woman who kept leaving me all those bizarre
messages about mutual funds, late trading, capacity, hedge funds and
market timing had called again. She had left at least three messages all
in rapid fire, exacting phrases like, "you should look into mutual funds
and hedge funds late trading stocks. What they are doing is illegal!",
4
She left no explanation and certainly not her name. More importantly,
she did not indicate how she knew about the alleged fraud. But there was
something about her tone that got my attention and piqued my interest. I
brought her phone calls to the attention of Roger Waldman, my
immediate supervisor. 5 I wanted to find out if he knew anything about
2. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, POOR RICHARD'S ALMANACK 27 (U.S.C. Publ'g Co.
1914).
3. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981) (holding that
"[d]irectors are under a continuing obligation to keep informed about the activities of
the corporation. Otherwise, they may not be able to participate in the overall
management of corporate affairs." (citing Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1924))). Id. at 822 ("Directors may not shut their eyes to corporate misconduct and
then claim that because they did not see the misconduct, they did not have a duty to
look. The sentinel asleep at his post contributes nothing to the enterprise he is charged
to protect." (citing Wilkinson v. Dodd, 42 N.J. Eq. 234, 245 (N.J. Ch. 1886))).
4. See BROOKE MASTERS, SPOILING FOR A FIGHT-THE RISE OF ELIOT SPITZER
135 (Times Books 2006).
5. See Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Robertson
Stevenson Settles Market Timing Case (Oct. 6, 2004), available at http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/media_center/2004/oct/oct6b_04.html.
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terms such as capacity, timing, and late trading, which I may have
missed during my own corporate transactional days on Wall Street, from
his days at Sullivan & Cromwell. He knew nothing. I could tell because
he had no reaction when I mentioned mutual funds and late trading. I
also shared the curious messages from the strange woman with Bureau
Chief, Eric Dinallo.6 I received permission to offer her transactional
immunity and to have her come to the New York State Attorney
General's Office to be queen for the day and share her story. All I had to
do was find her, convince her to testify, and turn state's witness-
because it was her civic duty.
For the next four days, I spent every spare moment in my office
awaiting the proverbial phone to ring and astutely avoided calls from
reporters, lawyers and persons of interest. At last, the phone rang in its
usual trill manner; I answered it half expecting a reporter or security
guard informing me that my afternoon appointment had arrived. It was
neither. "I'm that woman who has been calling you," a very polished
voice stated. "I'm glad you called," I replied with a mixture of relief
and elation in my voice. "I would like to help in any way that I can.
Tell me what's going on that has so disturbed you that you felt
compelled to contact me." It took forty-five minutes to transcribe what
was either one of the biggest frauds in corporate history or the biggest
piece of nonsense that ever came to my attention. Where the truth laid
would take months of detailed investigation, depositions, outright threats
and negotiated settlements to uncover. Through it all, the unfailing
courage of Noreen Harrington,7 a woman willing to risk everything to
help the American investing public, would be challenged again and
again.
6. See Profile of Eric R. Dinallo, Henry Kaufman Visiting Professor of Finance at
New York University's Leonard N. Stern School of Business, http://w4.stern.nyu.edu/
faculty/facultyindex.cgi?id=554 (last visited Nov. 2, 2009) (profiling Dinallo and
highlighting his service as 39th Superintendent of the New York State Insurance
Department).
7. Noreen Harrington, a respected 20-year Wall Street veteran, exposed the worst
scandal in mutual fund history. See Rebecca Leung, Meet a Major-League
Whistleblower: Woman Who Exposed Mutual Fund Scandal Talks to 60 Minutes II,
CBS NEWS, July 7, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/17/60II/main
600649.shtml. She was the whistleblower who revealed the misconduct in the recent
mutual fund scandals. Id. Her efforts, along with the Office of New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer, led to the end of late trading and market timing abuses, and
created industry reforms that benefit and protect an estimated 95 million investors. Id.
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The mutual fund fraud investigation focused on mutual fund
companies and their corresponding boards who prevented investors from
realizing the increased growth of particular mutual funds by
inappropriately permitting hedge funds to engage in activities such as
market timing8 and late trading.9 These fraudulent practices allowed
hedge funds to remove the unrealized profits from the mutual funds
before the mutual funds could recognize the gain for the benefit of the
investors in the mutual fund. Canary Capital, LLC was one of the few
hedge funds to reach a settlement with New York State Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer or the SEC, although dozens of hedge funds were
investigated by both regulatory agencies. Despite the questionable
conduct engaged in by dozens of investigated hedge funds, their conduct
was not per se illegal because it did not violate any specific federal or
state securities laws that applied to hedge funds. Ultimately, the
investigation resulted in a series of unprecedented agreements between
regulators-the Office of New York State Attorney General, Eliot
Spitzer, and the Securities & Exchange Commissionl°-and financial
8. Market timing is defined as "[t]he purchase and sale of securities based on
short-term price patterns as well as on asset values." TheFreeDictionary.com, Market
Timing, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/market+timing (last visited
Oct. 7, 2009). "Some analysts use fundamental analysis to select the securities to
purchase or sell; then they rely on market timing to decide when to trade those
securities." Id.
9. Late trading is defined as the "[i]llegal practice of obtaining the next day's net
asset value (NAV) of a mutual fund's shares and using this information to buy or sell
those shares at the previous day's prices." InvestorWords.com, Late Trading,
http://www.investorwords.com/7371/late-trading.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
As mutual funds usually compute the NAV at the close of a trading day (4:00 p.m.
Eastern Time) for the next day's trades, a trader placing a buy or sell order after the
closing time can still get that day's prices and can gain an unfair advantage over other
traders. According to the SEC, "Late trading violates the federal securities laws...
and defrauds innocent investors." Late trading, however, is not the same as after-hours
trading which is a legal practice.
Id.
10. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is a federal regulatory agency
that has jurisdiction over the U.S. securities market. See SEC, The Investor's Advocate:
How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilities Capital
Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 7, 2009)
[hereinafter Investor's Advocate]. Congress established the SEC in 1934 to enforce the
newly adopted 1933 Securities Act and the 1934 Exchange Act, to promote stability in
the markets and, most importantly, to protect investors. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a)
(2006) (establishing the SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) (setting out the rationale for the
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firms." The 2004 settlements resulted in payments of approximately $2
billion. They also required numerous structural changes in mutual fund
regulation, such as changes to mutual fund fee calculation, board
structure and disclosure to investors. Hedge funds emerged from the
mutual fund fraud investigation unscathed; the industry was not subject
to any new regulatory oversight.
Few, if any, federal or state securities laws apply to hedge funds.
This lack of regulation makes it nearly impossible for the government or
investors to these pools of capital accountable for any questionable
conduct in the securities and financial markets. During the last decade,
the rapid growth of the hedge fund industry--evidenced by increases in
metrics such as assets under management, volume of trading, frequency
of transactions and the scope of the firms' activities-has given
regulators and the investing public cause for concern. Important
questions remain unanswered: most importantly, what should be done
when hedge funds employ manipulative schemes which enrich hedge
funds at the expense of the integrity, stability and soundness of the
financial system?
For example, imagine a hedge fund has slowly accumulated a
sizable amount of credit default swaps ("CDS"), which require the CDS
issuer to compensate the CDS purchaser in the event a company whose
credit risk is insured by the swap ('target') cannot repay its debts. 12 The
fund's purchases put upward pressure on the price of these swaps, a
development which is perceived by the market as a reflection of
SEC and regulation of securities markets). The SEC describes its function as promoting
and facilitating investor access to essential investment related information by
"promoting the disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining fair
dealing, and protecting against fraud." Investor's Advocate, supra.
11. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General,
Spitzer, S.E.C. Reach Largest Mutual Fund Settlement Ever (Mar. 15, 2004), available
at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2004/mar/marl 5c_04.html.
12. InvestorWords.com, Credit Default Swap, http://www.investorwords.com/
5876/creditdefault swap.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009).
A specific kind of counterparty agreement which allows the transfer of third party
credit risk from one party to the other. One party in the swap is a lender and faces
credit risk from a third party, and the counterparty in the credit default swap agrees to
insure this risk in exchange of regular periodic payments (essentially an insurance
premium). If the third party defaults, the party providing insurance will have to
purchase from the insured party the defaulted asset. In turn, the insurer pays the
insured the remaining interest on the debt, as well as the principal.
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investors' concerns about the target's ability to meet its financial
obligations. If the hedge fund were to publish and widely disseminate a
negative research report about the target company, whose securities are
subject to the fund's substantial 'short position,' 13 then the price of the
target's equity is likely to decline and the cost of CDS payable in the
event of the target's default' 4 would rise. The hedge fund could then
capitalize on these developments and sell into a market reacting to the
fund's report. The hedge fund's profits would come at the expense of the
target's shareholders, creditors,' 5 employees and business partners. 16
A more striking example is when a hedge fund trades the mutual
fund's shares after the close of the market. Due to technological
advances, these late trades appear to be a routine part of the mutual
fund's after hours clearing process. ' 7 Late trading in mutual fund shares
should be deemed illegal. These activities are barely within the
periphery of legitimate transactions on behalf of the mutual fund's long-
term investors. Unfortunately, the drafters of current federal and state
securities laws did not envision this type of schemes.
These hedge fund investment schemes detrimentally impact the
investing public both financially and psychologically. The value of
assets held by traditional investors is impaired as the schemes
unjustifiably siphon long-term investors' unrealized profits. Perhaps
more importantly, such schemes call into question the integrity of the
markets and diminish the markets' appeal for many investors. Such
dubious hedge fund activities are cause for concern about the lack of
13. InvestorWords.com, Short Position, http://www.investorwords.com/4554/
shortposition.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2009). A short position is defined in two ways:
a futures contract where there is "the promise to sell a certain quantity of a good at a
particular price in the future" and as "[selling] a stock short." Id.
14. Products with the characteristics of a CDS might otherwise be called
"protection" or "insurance." Here, however, the hedge fund has no underlying credit
exposure to the target. The fund's investment in the CDS is purely speculative. Under
such circumstances, a CDS is neither insurance, nor protection; it is just a bet.
15. The target's creditors include holders of its publicly-traded debt, which would
presumably fall in value as the market reacts to the price of CDS involving the target.
16. As the target's equities and bonds decline in value, the target will find it more
costly to make acquisitions or borrow. These developments will impede any new
investment, expansion, or hiring by the target company.
17. See Bloomberg News, 2 Sued on Trading Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005,
at C4. The SEC filed a complaint against two hedge funds who allegedly "took
advantage of a Bear Sterns system that allowed them to buy or sell mutual fund shares
after a 4 p.m. regulatory cutoff." Id.
2009 HEDGE FUND FRA UD 29
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
hedge fund regulation. The current financial crisis makes Congressional
action to address the lack of hedge fund regulation imperative.
This Article offers an alternative legal and factual framework to
monitor and regulate hedge fund activity. Its proposed solutions could
be adopted by state, federal and international regulators. After exam-
ining the policy arguments commonly advanced by opponents of hedge
fund regulation, this Article concludes that public good principles
strongly support comprehensive hedge fund regulation based on a hybrid
hedge fund governance matrix.
The foundation for this Article's conclusion is the principle of
'public good.' Part I discusses the historical development of the
American public good concept and, in particular, its application to early
corporations. Rampant fraud led state governments to assume respon-
sibility for protecting the investing public and adopt anti-fraud
provisions in state securities laws. New York State's Martin Act is a
prominent example of such state regulation. 18 The federal government,
pressured by the states, responded with comprehensive anti-fraud
regulation and disclosure requirements.
Hedge funds are a recent and confusing phenomenon. Part II
discusses the historical development of hedge funds, including their
exemptions from federal securities regulation. In particular, the industry
18. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2009). "There is also an ongoing
debate whether the consumer fraud provisions of the General Business Law [Section]
349, extend to securities transactions. New York is one of the few states which have not
adopted the Uniform Securities Act .... Robert A. McTamaney, New York's Martin
Act: Expanding Enforcement in an Era of Federal Securities Regulation, 18 LEGAL
BACKGROUNDER 1 n.1 (2003). New York State's "securities laws were left largely in
place when the series of federal securities laws were passed in the 1930s and 1940s." Id.
at 2. "The Martin Act really became a sleeping giant in 1955, with the addition of
criminal penalties." See id. These are unique remedies which few other state securities
laws possess especially when "coupled with the [Martin Act's] broad 'fraud'
provisions," which can be triggered without the necessity of proving intent, also known
as scienter. Id. Scienter is "the willful and knowing commission of an illegal act,
without proof of intent to defraud." Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). "In 1986, intentional
violations were made felonies." Id. at 3. "[T]he Martin Act arguably is hardly a fraud
statute at all, but rather is specifies virtually per se criminal and civil liability" if the
prohibited conduct occurs. ld. at 3. An interesting "absence is any provision for civil
damage suits by individuals, and the courts have consistently refused to imply one." Id.
Additionally, the Martin Act provides broad administrative discovery and subpoena
power and ex parte injunctive relied are all permitted and available to the Attorney
General's Office. Id.
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is exempt from the public offering registration requirements of the
Securities Act of 1933,' 9 the periodic reporting obligations of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,0 the registration requirements of the
Investment Company Act of 194021 and the registration requirements of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.22
Part III discusses federal regulators' concerns about hedge funds,
including the public's increasing exposure to hedge funds vis-A-vis
public pension funds. Part III also examines the SEC's failed attempt to
regulate hedge funds.
This theoretical, historical and legislative backdrop belies the hedge
fund industry's pervasive lack of disclosure and reliance on
objectionable investment strategies such as short selling, credit default
swaps and the use of excessive leverage. Part IV examines such
practices. Part V continues with an examination of manipulative hedge
fund activities such as late trading, marketing timing and publication of
negative research reports.
This Article makes a compelling case for new regulation. Part VI
outlines an alternative approach to hedge fund regulation based on a
four-prong hybrid hedge fund governance matrix.
Finally, the Article concludes the public interest in the viability of
the financial and securities markets and the economic stability of global
economies is advanced by comprehensive hedge fund regulation.
19. Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(2) (2006); Philip A. Loomis, Jr.,
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 214, 215 (1959) ("The [Securities Act] deals principally with
distribution of new issues .... ).
20. Loomis, supra note 19, at 214 ("The [Securities Exchange Act] superimposes a
rather complex regulatory structure upon the intricate and sensitive mechanism of the
securities market."); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006).
21. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 to 80a-b4 (2006).
22. Loomis, supra note 19, at 214 ("The [Investment Advisors Act] by contrast is a
rather simple statute touching on a few aspects of a field not yet completely explored.");
Investment Advisors Act of 1940 §§ 201-22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (2006).
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I. ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GOOD CONCEPT
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far
greater part of the members are poor and miserable.
-Adam Smith
2 3
In the mid-1800s, Alexis de Tocqueville left France to travel
through the young American republic, and he made an interesting
discovery. He observed Americans' concept of public good was
grounded in the belief that "[t]he personal advantage of each member of
the community may result in working for the good of all."24 Such an
outlook did not specifically require virtue or institutions to per se reward
cooperation for the public good. In fact, those who declined to cooperate
for the public good were not punished. The structure of the American
public good concept, in Tocqueville's view, was analytically incoherent.
It offered no reason to believe an individual, motivated by self-interest,
would come to adopt cooperative behavior as a voluntary selection for
the public's good. Opportunities to free ride on the cooperative behavior
of others exist simply by virtue of community membership. While this
seemed especially strange to Tocqueville, he found Americans were
convinced it was in their interest to be virtuous.25
A. Application of Public Good to Early American Corporations
Corporations are such an integral part of American culture that it is
difficult, if not impossible, to imagine a time when they did not exist.
The historical development of American corporate law is rooted in
economic, military, and political forces. Early American corporations
were established primarily to allow private resources to accomplish
public functions that government was unable to finance, such as the
23. I ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY TO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 70 (J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1914) (1910).
24. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 500 (Henry Reeve & Delba
Winthrop trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835). The conflict between private
and public good had become congruent for most Americans-that is to say, "self
interest well understood" became "the interest of each to be honest." Tocqueville
described the concept of "self interest well understood" in the quoted language above.
Id.
25. Id. at 501.
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creation of canals, railroads, bridges, tunnels, and highways.26 Initially,
corporations were largely creatures of the state government, borne of
legislative charter and limited in duration.27 Once a corporation achieved
its purpose, such as the completion of a bridge, it ceased to exist. As the
American economy expanded, popular acceptance of corporations as a
means of facilitating public work projects grew 28 in tandem with the
demand for business ventures and corporate charters. 29 As a result, a
number of states enacted general business corporate statutes and the
incorporation process was increasingly uniform."
In the 1800s, America experienced an industrial revolution. The
explosion of industry transformed an agrarian America into an industrial
society.3 This change required large infusions of capital to fund
development and growth.32 Fueling industrial growth was the emergence
of markets in which all Americans could invest in private corporations
for profit. Previously, investment was an activity only available to the
rich. The expanded pool of investors needed stock markets 33 in which
they could acquire and dispose of their holdings.
26. See Susan Pace Hamill, From Special Privilege to General Utility: A
Continuation of Willard Hurst's Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 93
(1999). "As the eighteenth century came to a close and the early decades of the
nineteenth century unfolded, state legislatures began to issue significant numbers of
corporate charters for banks and transportation projects." Id.
27. See ALFRED F. CONARD & HENRY M. BUTZEL, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE
178 (Foundation Press 1976). "[I]ncorporation was the formation of a contract which
was unconditionally binding on all of the parties. The principle escape hatch was the
expiration of the contract; many early corporations were apparently formed for limited
terms, and some 19th century laws required limitations ranging from 25 to 100 years."
Id. The idea that a corporation has an expiration date is no longer espoused, and most
modem day "corporation codes grant perpetual life." Id.
28. See Hamill, supra note 26, at 92. "the colonial assemblies and the early state
legislatures issued the vast majority of corporate charters for public purposes." Id.
29. Id. at 97-98.
30. Id. at 101-03.
31. See id. at 98. "America's transformation from a predominantly agricultural and
mercantile economy to a market economy displaced and negatively affected many
individuals." Id.
32. See id. at 98. "[F]or most of the 1820s, business and commerce grew steadily,
and the state-chartered business corporation, which was on its way to becoming the
dominant legal form for conducting all commercial enterprises, experienced little overt
controversy." Id.
33. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1554 (9th ed. 2009). The business of a stock
market is to facilitate investors coming together to buy and sell stocks. Id.
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B. Anti-Fraud Provisions of Blue Sy Laws
Initially, regulation did not keep pace with the development of
markets. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the federal securities
laws did not exist.34 In 1911, Kansas became the first state to create state
securities laws to protect its residents.35 Throughout the 1920s, many
states adopted securities laws to protect their residents.36 New York
developed its famous securities laws through the adoption of the 1921
Martin-Webb Act.37 Many other states followed suit and began to adopt
state securities laws commonly referred to as blue sky laws,38 so-named
when the Supreme Court explained, in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., "[t]he
name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is aimed...
[the] 'speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet
of blue sky ....
Despite the Court's appreciation of the legislative intent behind the
34. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the
Institutionalization of the Securities Market, 95 VA. L. REv. 1025, 1028 (2009). The
Federal Trade Commission acquired jurisdiction to pass the first federal securities laws
in 1933. Id.
35. See Jonathan M. Sobel, A Rose May Not Always Be a Rose: Some General
Partnership Interests Should Be Deemed Securities Under the Federal Securities Acts,
15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1313, 1323 n.49 (1994).
36. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229 (2003) ("Between 1911 and 1931, 47 of the 48
states adopted statutes that regulated the sale of securities."). See also CONARD &
BUTZEL, supra note 27, at 22 (discussing how Kansas took the lead among state
legislatures passing securities laws requiring substantial disclosures and laying hefty
penalties for non-compliance).
37. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2009). Former New York State
Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, used the Martin Act vigorously between 2001 and 2006
to prosecute financial service entities that defrauded New York State residents. See
MASTERS, supra note 4, 70-72, 88-99.
38. SEC, Blue Sky Laws, http://www.sec.gov/answers.shtml (last visited Oct. 7,
2009) (defining blue sky laws as state securities laws that are designed to protect
investors against fraudulent sales practices and activities). See Mahoney, supra note 36,
at 229.
39. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1916) (stating that name [blue
sky] comes from testimony that such state statutes protect investors from "speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 'blue sky'). "[T]he law is a
regulation of business, [it] constrains conduct only to that end, the purpose being to
protect the public against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities
based upon them." Id.
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statutes, remedies were limited. Very few blue sky laws provided a
private right of action.40 Only state regulators could commence lawsuits
against corporations on behalf of the injured shareholders and state
residents. In addition, corporations were required to provide full and fair
disclosure as to the purpose of the investment. Several states also
allowed state regulators to prevent the filing of a security offering if they
had reason to believe that a particular securities offering would result in
a fraud, inequity, or that the offering failed to meet the standard of being
fair, just, and equitable.42
New York's 1921 enactment 43 of the Martin Act finally enshrined
the principle "thou shall not commit fraud" into state law.44 The Martin
Act vested the power to prosecute fraud, but only minimal control over
the sale of securities, in the New York Attorney General's Office. The
original Martin Act was a weak law and no enforcement actions were
commenced for years after its adoption. In 1925, New York State
Attorney General Albert Ottinger successfully advanced a broad view of
the Attorney General's Office's powers under the Martin Act. "Ottinger
sought out high-profile fraud cases and used the Martin Act to shut
down the Consolidated Stock Exchange".45 While Ottinger's actions
40. See, e.g., Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am.
Secs., 592 F. Supp. 2d 608, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (stating there is no implied right of
action under New York's Martin Act); In re Nat'l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 541 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 1010 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (stating that while New Jersey and Oregon's Blue
Sky Laws delineated prohibited conduct and allowed for civil remedies, neither
provided a private right of action); Pearce v. Duchesneau Group, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d
63, 76 (D. Mass. 2005) (stating that plaintiff faced a problem because Massachusetts
Blue Sky Laws did not provide a private right of action).
41. See Mahoney, supra note 36, at 231. "Prior to selling a security in Kansas, the
issuer had to file an application with the banking commissioner detailing financial and
narrative information about its business. No sales could be made unless the
commissioner approved the offering." Id.
42. See id. "[T]he commissioner... could reject an offering if he concluded that
the issuer '[did] not intend to do a fair and honest business' or '[did] not promise a fair
return on the stocks, bonds, or other securities it offered for sale.' This broad authority
came to be known as 'merit review."' Id.
43. See MASTERS, supra note 4, at 49.
44. See Symposium, Sixth Annual Corporate Law Symposium: Contemporary
Issues in Securities Regulations, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 393 (1993) (stating that "blue sky
laws" were enacted to provide regulation of securities offerings/sales for the purpose of
preventing fraud).
45. Nicholas Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June 2004, at
50. Attorney General Ottinger summed up his record as "Hammer, hammer, hammer,
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angered major financial institutions and prompted several prominent
court challenges, a series of favorable court rulings noted endemic fraud
called for an expansion of the Martin Act.46 In 1955, Attorney General
Jacob Javits appointed David Clurman to rewrite the Martin Act in a
manner more protective of the public. Clurman, building on the
interpretation of the mail-fraud statutes by Judge Learned Hand a few
decades earlier, drafted provisions which granted the Attorney General
civil and criminal prosecution power. Other provisions relieved the
Attorney General of the responsibility to prove any buyer was actually
defrauded or sale actually took place. Such measures allowed the
Attorney General to prosecute fraudulent schemes before investors were
victimized by the schemes. Clurman's mandate was simple: "thou shall
not commit fraud."47 Since Clurman's revisions, the Martin Act has
evolved into a broad sweeping investigative statute.
The Martin Act provided New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer with broad civil and criminal powers to prosecute entities for
financial fraud.48 Spitzer's Office initiated a Martin Act investigation of
Merrill Lynch in April 2001 for failure to disclose conflict of interest
between Merrill Lynch's investment banking business and research
department based. Spitzer built the case against Merrill, in part, on e-
mails sent from stock analyst Henry Blodget.49  Emails snippets
suggested the technology analyst routinely recommended stocks he did
not personally believe where worthwhile.5 °  Merrill agreed to a
settlement within a few weeks and paid $100 million in penalty.
In 2002, Eliot Spitzer's Office initiated a Martin Act investigation
at every manner and means of fraud and dishonesty, the prevention and assertion of
which the Legislature has assigned to the Attorney General." Id. at 51-52.
46. Id.
47. Thompson, supra note 45, at 50.
48. See Dietrich L. Snell & Wendy T. Wu, New York State's Martin Act an Outline
of the New York Attorney General's Powers and Practices, in PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS
IN SECURITIES ACTIONS (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI Order
No. 14655, 2008).
49. See Charles Gasparino, The Stock-Research Pact: How Settlement Train Kept
on Track, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at C 1.
50. Press Release, Office of the New York State Attorney General, Spitzer, Merrill
Lynch Reach Unprecedented Agreement to Reform Investment Practices (May 21,
2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2002/may/may21a_
02.html; but see John J. McConnell, Spitzer Spears the Truth, WALL ST. J., May 15,
2002, at A 18 (arguing "[u]pon closer examination, however, [Spitzer's] charges appear
to be a fundamental mischaracterization of the messages in question").
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against several investment banking firms.5' Allegations suggested the
banks inflated stock prices through the issuance of research reports by
their affiliated brokerage firms and doled out valuable opportunities to
invest early in initial public offerings to influential members of the
business community in order to curry their favor. The banks entered into
a global settlement and paid approximately $1.4 billion in fines. 52 The
settlement also required the firms to establish compliance divisions to
supervise stock analysts and investment bankers and insulate stock
analysts from internal pressure to attract investment banking business. 3
In 2003, Eliot Spitzer's Office started a Martin Act investigation
against several commercial banks, mutual funds and hedge funds which
led to the disclosure of one of the greatest frauds against the investing
public. Spitzer's Office investigation revealed that mutual funds failed to
disclose that they allowed select clients (primarily hedge funds) trading
privileges which harmed ordinary investors. Spitzer's Office targeted
two practices, in particular, late trading54 and market timing.55 Through
a series of prosecutions and lawsuits, joined in many instances by the
SEC, the CFTC,56 and various state securities regulators, Spitzer's
51. Ten investment banking firms were named in the complaint including Bear
Steams, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan
Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Salomon Smith Barney, and
UBS Warburg. Jane Ulick, Wall Street Deal Inked, CNNMONEY, Dec. 20, 2001,
http://money.cnn.com/2002/12/20/news/economy/settlementwallstreet/index.htm.
52. Press Release, SEC, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking
(Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
53. See id.
54. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
56. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission is hereinafter referred to as the
CFTC. However, certain footnotes cite to the CFTC as the Commission. See 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)(2) (2006) (establishing Commodity Futures Trading Commission as an
independent agency under Commodity Exchange Act). The statute provides, in relevant
part:
The Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... over accounts, agreements ...
and transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery ... ,
traded or executed on a contract market designated or derivatives transaction
execution facility registered pursuant to section 7 or 7a [7 U.S.C. § 7] or any other
board of trade, exchange, or market, and transaction subject to regulation by the
Commission pursuant to [7 U.S.C. § 23].
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A).
The CFTC describes itself as an independent agency with the mandate to regulate
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Office secured approximately $2 billion in fines and remuneration for
investors as well as forcing many managerial reforms within the mutual
fund industry to protect the investing public.
C. Disclosure Under the Federal Securities Laws to Protect Investors
Federal rules were designed to protect the general public from fraud
in the securities market. The laws' mechanisms for protection include
disclosure and trading restrictions. The Securities Act requires a
securities issuer, typically a mid-sized to large corporation, to disclose a
broad array of financial and operational information in exchange for the
right to sell stocks to the public in the capital markets.57 Congress
established the Exchange Act to prevent manipulation of the secondary
market for an issuer's outstanding publicly traded securities. The issuer
must continually appraise the public about the state of its operations and
finances.58 The issuer's insiders, including members of its board of
directors, its officers, employees and advisers, are subject to trading
restrictions if they possess certain non-public information.5 9
The stock market crash of 1929,60 and the subsequent Great
commodity futures and option markets in the United States. The agency's mandate has
been renewed and expanded several times since its establishment, most recently by the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 ("CFMA"). Pub. L. No. 106-554 §
l(a)(5), 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (enacting into law § 401 of Title IV of H.R. 5660, 114
Stat. 2763A-457, as introduced on Dec. 14, 2000) (codified in 7 U.S.C. § 2). Today, the
CFTC assures the economic utility of the futures market by encouraging
competitiveness and efficiency, ensuring integrity, protecting market participants
against manipulation, abusive trading practices, fraud, and ensuring the financial
integrity of the clearing process. The CFTC enables the futures market to serve the
important function of providing a means for price discovery and offsetting price risk.
57. See 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006).
58. See Loomis, supra note 19, at 214-15.
59. See 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (2009).
60. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 149 (1936) (stating that the
stock market crash bf 1929 ushered in the Great Depression); see Ben Wattenberg,
Stock Market Crash, The First Measured Century, PBS, http://www.pbs.o.-gfmc/
timeline/estockmktcrash.htm (hereinafter Wattenberg). From 1920 to 1929 stocks more
than quadrupled in value. Id. See also In re Pate's Estate, 84 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (N.Y.
Sur. 1948).
Many investors became convinced that stocks were a sure thing and borrowed heavily
to invest more money in the market. But in 1929, the bubble burst and stocks started
down an even more precipitous cliff. In 1932 and 1933, they hit bottom, down about
80% from their highs in the late 1920s. This had sharp effects on the economy ...
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Depression 61 led Congress to enact the Securities Act 62 and the
Securities Exchange Act.63 The public policy imperative, to protect the
investing public through the promotion of equal access to information
for all market participants, has not changed since Congress enacted the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. 64
[and it caused] chaos in the banking system as banks tried to collect on loans made to
stock market investors whose holdings were now worth little or nothing at all. Worse,
many banks had themselves invested depositors' money in the stock market. When
word spread that banks' assets contained huge uncollectable loans and almost
worthless stock certificates, depositors rushed to withdraw their savings. Unable to
raise fresh funds from the Federal Reserve System, banks began failing by the
hundreds in 1932 and 1933. . . . [Tihe banking system of the United States had
largely ceased to function. Depositors had seen $140 billion disappear when their
banks failed.
Wattenberg, supra. As a result, the federal government established the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation to ensure depositors' money; the government promise to
reimburse depositors. Id.
61. See JOH-N P. MORIARTY & CURTLAN R. MCNEILY, 19 REGULATION OF
FINANCIAL PLANNERS § 3:1 n.1 (2009) ("The Advisers Act was the end of a string of
federal statutes enacted to correct conditions which Congress believed had contributed
to the 1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression which followed. Specifically,
the Advisers Act was adopted to correct the 'problems and abuses' in investment
counselling services." (citing S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 21 (1940))).
62. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (2006).
63. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78oo (2006).
64. See Andrew Downey Orrick, Commissioner, Securities & Exchange
Commission, Address at Town Hall, Los Angeles, California: What Is the SEC Doing
to Protect the Public from Securities Fraud 1 (Nov. 13, 1956) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1956/1l1356orrick.pdf). "The mission of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation." Investor's Advocate, supra note 10.
[T]he SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other
information to the public. This provides a common pool of knowledge for all investors
to use to judge for themselves whether to buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only
through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can
people make sound investment decisions. The result of this information flow is a far
more active, efficient, and transparent capital market that facilitates the capital
formation so important to our nation's economy. To insure that this objective is
always being met, the SEC continually works with all major market participants,
including especially the investors in the securities markets, to listen to their concerns
and to learn from their experience. The SEC oversees the key participants in the
securities world, including securities exchanges, securities brokers and dealers,
investment advisors, and mutual funds. Here the SEC is concerned primarily with
promoting the disclosure of important market-related information, maintaining fair
dealing, and protecting against fraud.
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Disclosure remains the heart of the regulatory scheme.
"[P]rofessional market participants [must] assimilate publicly available
information and disseminate it to the investing public. ' 65 Investors are
expected to read and comprehend this material for their own
protection. 66  Mandatory and ongoing disclosure by publicly-traded
companies facilitates investor education. All securities are registered
under the Securities Act 67 and issuers must comply with the disclosure
requirements under the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment
Advisers Act.68 Provisions of the Investment Company Act may also
apply.
69
The hedge fund industry argues transactional risk and compliance
with federal securities laws is regulated under the laws which apply to
the public companies with which they trade.7° Specifically, hedge funds
argue, heavily regulated banks, broker-dealers and insurance companies
65. Henry Odower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C. DAVIS
Bus. L.J. 323, 331 (2007).
66. See Vadim Kotelnikov, Venture Financing: Process and Selection Criteria,
http://www.1000ventures.com/venturefinancing/due diligence.html (last visited Oct.
3, 2009). "Due diligence emphasizes understanding and quantifying the risk of the
proposed deal, rather than the upside." Id.
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006) ("[t]he term
'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement .... ).
68. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006). "[T]he
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 emerged as a statute which would require investment
advisers to register and to furnish certain information about themselves, thus providing
a 'compulsory census' of investment advisers and which would provide 'in a small
degree for the regulation of some of their activities." Loomis, supra note 19, at 218,
245.
69. See Laurin Blumenthal Kleiman & Carla G. Teodoro, Forming, Organizing
and Operating a Mutual Fund-Legal and Practical Considerations, in THE ABCS OF
MuTuAL FUNDs 11, 15, 37 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, PLI
Order No. 18809, 2006). "Funds that are excepted from the definition of 'investment
company,' as that term is defined under the Investment Company Act, under certain
provisions that strictly limit the manner in which fund interests are sold and the number
and/or qualifications of their investors. These unregistered funds are offered privately
and are commonly referred to as 'hedge funds."' Id at 15.
70. Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds (Ohio State Public Law Working
Paper No. 71 & Center for Interdisciplinary Law and Policy Studies Working Paper
Series No. 47, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=913045 [hereinafter Oesterle
Report].
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are required to implement proper internal controls to monitor their
exposure to hedge fund activity and potential losses.7 ' They also argue
the economic efficiency and capital allocation benefits they provide to
the markets outweigh the potential risk of loss their counterparties
face.7 2 Disclosure, the industry argues, is valuable where the economic
benefits of disclosure are equal to its economic cost.73 Still, even the
industry must acknowledge the many ways they benefit from disclosure:
the possibility of achieving more favorable terms on loans, lower costs
of trading and increased attractiveness to investors.74
Some argue regulation would hinder hedge funds competitive
advantage 75 and favor measures to even the playing field. They call for
the deregulation of registered investment companies, like mutual funds,
so a broader range of investors can enjoy the same advantages as hedge
funds.76 Such sentiments are misguided. Many of the strategies hedge
funds employ; short-selling, excessive leverage and strategic publication
of negative research reports; are inappropriate for mutual funds.
Registered companies profitability is better achieved through long-term
growth than a methodological race to the bottom in which even
unscrupulous means of turning a profit are permitted and encouraged.77
A mutual fund's performance should not be a function of indiscriminate
use of any and all strategies with the potential to generate double digit
returns, irrespective of the impact of said strategies on the markets and
global economy.
The main purpose of federal regulation is protection of the general
public even to the extent of foregoing the extraordinary profits. Other
71. See Editorial, Hedge Fund Realities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at A18. See
infra note 200 and accompanying text for a discussion on Lehman Brothers and how
regulated companies are unable to properly monitor and quantify their potential losses
as a result of engaging in hedge fund activities.
72. See J.W. Verret, Dr. Jones and the Raiders of Lost Capital: Hedge Fund
Regulation, Part I, A Self-Regulation Proposal, 32 DEL. J. COP. L. 799, 815 (2007).
73. See Kathleen E. Lange, The New Antifraud Rule: Is SEC Enforcement the Most
Effective Way to Protect Investors from Hedge Fund Fraud?, 77 FoRDHAM L. REv. 851,
882 (2008).
74. Houman B. Shadab, The Challenge of Hedge Fund Regulation: As Other
Nations Expand Access to Hedge Funds, Should the U.S. Adopt Tighter Regulation?,
ALLBUSrNESS.COM (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.allbusiness.com/banking-finance/
financial-markets-investing-funds/8940884- 1.html.
75. See Oesterle Report, supra note 70.
76. See id.
77. See, e.g., Verret, supra note 72, at 824.
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commentators argue that the SEC is a reactionary agency. In the absence
of a crisis, they say, it is unlikely the SEC or any other regulators will
move to reform the hedge fund industry.78 Today's dire economic times
are ripe for decisive congressional action to adopt comprehensive hedge
fund regulation.
II. UNDERSTANDING HEDGE FUNDS
No enterprise is more likely to succeed than one concealed
from the enemy until it is ripe for execution.
-Niccolo Machiavelli79
"Who are [hedge fund managers] and what are they doing?"8°
There is not a single definition of hedge funds.8 The term hedge fund
was first used by Alfred Winslow Jones in 194982 when he attempted to
manage a fund comprised of pooled investments. The pool consisted of
78. See Roberta S. Karmel, The SEC at 70: Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge
Funds and Stock Market Volatility-What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 949 (2005) (arguing that
"in the absence of a new crisis involving derivatives, excessive leverage in the market
or manipulative activities by institutional investors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC
or any other financial regulator will decide to study and reform institutional investors'
behavior").
79. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE ART OF WAR 202 (Ellis Farneworth trans., De
Capo Press, 2d ed. 2001) (1520).
80. Kara Scannell et al., No Consensus on Regulating Hedge Funds, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 5, 2007, at C1 (quoting Lisa McGreevy, Director, Managed Funds Ass'n).
81. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating there is
no single definition of the phrase "hedge fund"); see also SEC STAFF, IMPLICATIONS OF
THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 9-10 (2003) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT], available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf; Troy A. Paredes, Hedge
Funds and the SEC: Observations on the How and Why of Securities 1-2 (Wash. Univ.
Sch. of Law, Faculty Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 07-05-01, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=984450 (citing ROGER
LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT (2000)).
82. Douglas W. Hawes, Hedge Funds-Investment Funds for the Rich, 23 Bus.
LAWYER 576, 577 (1967-68) (stating that the first hedge fund was established by A.W.
Jones & Co. in 1949); see also Carol Loomis, The Jones Nobody Keeps Up With,
FORTUNE, Apr. 2006, at 237; Stephen J. Brown, Keynote Address at the PACAP/FMA
Meeting, Melbourne, Australia: Hedge Funds: Omniscient or Just Plain Wrong (July 7,
2000), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/-sbrown/omniscient.pdf.
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various investors and Jones used an investing strategy of long and short
equity positions." Jones envisioned that short sales of the equity
positions would counter-balance the risk of holding long positions. In
turn, the strategy would allow for capital appreciation while "hedging"
against risk of loss due to events in the market. 84 One court 85 noted the
phrase 'hedge fund' better described the legal management structure
than the investment strategy used by the fund. 6 Hedge funds are
intentionally structured to minimize federal regulation, federal and state
taxes, and to maximize trading strategies which result in phenomenal
returns.87
In general, hedge funds are unregulated pools of private money.88
They are funded with capital in search of an investment vehicle which
utilizes sophisticated financial strategies in the securities, currency, and
derivative markets to obtain above average returns. Some hedge fund
managers achieve lofty returns for their clients and are handsomely
rewarded. Hedge fund managers typically receive a one to two percent
annual management fee and twenty percent of any profits.8 9 In 2005, the
top 25 hedge funds took in more than $130 million in fees.9°
83. See Loomis, supra note 82, at 237.
84. See Brown, supra note 82, at 5; see also Loomis, supra note 82, at 240.
85. See Brown, supra note 82, at 5; see also Loomis, supra note 82, at 240.
86. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("distinctive feature of
hedge funds is their management structure"). "[D]omestic hedge funds are usually
structured as limited partnerships to achieve maximum separation of ownership and
management." Id.
87. See Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U.C.
DAVIS Bus. L.J. 323, 330 (2007) (describing popular hedge fund structures to avoid
registration, and explaining the regulatory planning that accounts for hedge fund
success).
88. See id at 324. Private money is defined as money raised by hedge funds from
wealthy and institutional investors utilizing the "private offering" exemption under the
1933 Securities Act, Regulation 506 of Regulation D. See STUART A. MCCRARY,
HEDGE FUND COURSE 129 (2005); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
89. See SCOTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUNDS IN FINANCIAL PRODUCT
FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS 11:2.2, at 11-15 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed. 2000).
See also Jenny Anderson, Atop Hedge Funds, Richest of the Rich Get Even More So,
N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2006, at C2 ("[the] magic behind the money is [the] compensation
structure of hedge funds"). Endowments and pensions funds flocked to invest in hedge
funds, further fueling the hedge fund boom. Id.
90. See Oesterle Report, supra note 70 (stating that the hedge fund managers who
are able to deliver high returns will be able to create new, "follow-up funds" to which
investors will continue to flock with the expectation of receiving the same fabulous
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A. Brief History of Hedge Funds
In theory, a hedge should deliver positive returns in any market
cycle. 91 Hedge funds' most attractive trait is their theoretical ability to
earn positive returns un- or minimally correlated with macroeconomic
market returns 9' or volatility. 93  In the parlance of sophisticated
investors, hedge funds provide excellent 'alpha,' or risk adjusted
performance. 94 As a class, the hedge fund sector was spared from the
damage inflicted when the internet bubble of the late 1990s bursted
shortly after the turn of the twenty-first century. 95 Such returns,
especially in declining or 'bear' markets, are arguably bolstered by
hedge funds' ability to exploit lax trading regulations to profit from the
misfortune of others; 96 hedge funds are more likely to employ short-
selling 97 and other trading strategies which enable them to profit from
returns).
91. See Erika Kinetz, Little Guys in the Big Leagues, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8,
2005, at § 3.
92. See David J. Brophy et al., Hedge Funds as Investors of Last Resort, 22 REV.
FIN. STUDIES 541 (2009) (stating that struggling companies that receive financing from
hedge funds significantly underperform as compared to struggling companies that
receive funding elsewhere).
93. Nicole M. Boyson et al., Is There Hedge Fund Contagion? (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper 12090, 2006); Bing Liang et al., Market Volatility,
Investor Flows and the Structure of Hedge Fund Markets (Inst. for Quantitative
Research in Fin., Working Paper, 2006); see also Barry Riley, Editorial, Weekend
Money: Through the Hedge Fund Maze: Do British Investors Really Need These
"Alternative Strategists?", FIN. TIMES MANDATE, May 11, 1996 ("you could call most
of them speculators").
94. Nicholas Chan et al., Systemic Risk and Hedge Funds, in THE RISKS OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 235 (Mark Carey & Rend Stultz eds., Univ. of Chicago Press
2007); Robert Kosowski et al., Do Hedge Funds Deliver Alpha? A Bayesian and
Bootstrap Analysis, 84 J. FIN. EcoN. 229 (2007).
95. See Emma Trincal, Merrill Says Diversify with Bonds, Not Hedge Funds,
HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Feb. 26, 2008 (stating hedge funds were "an asset class
that investors found attractive for downside protection during the bear market that
followed the burst of the Internet bubble").
96. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 31.
97. See id. at 34-35; Investopedia.com, Short Selling, http://www.investopedia.
com/terms/s/shortselling.asp ("[t]he selling of a security that the seller does not own, or
any sale that is completed by the delivery of a security borrowed by the seller. Short
sellers assume that they will be able to buy the stock at a lower amount than the price at
which they sold short"); see also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 33-36; Hedge
Fund Research, Strategy Definitions (2001), available at http://www.hedgefund
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market declines.
98
Despite the hedge fund industry's complexity and technology,
hedge funds have not historically outperformed market indexes. 99 In
fact, hedge funds do not display any stock picking ability superior to the
average investor."' A recent study determined the average investor
would fare better in a passive and diversified portfolio'0 ' given the
efficient market hypothesis, which postulates current prices reflect all
available knowledge material to the performance of a public company.
If accepted, an attempt to select undervalued stocks is an exercise in
futility. 102
Hedge funds investments are typically subject to a "lock-in"
arrangement. During the lock-up period investors may not withdraw
their funds. 0 3 Lock-up periods can range from six months to five
years. 104 Lock-up period restrictions apply to investors' ability to
transfer or sell their interest in a hedge fund.0 5 Even after the expiration
of the lock-up period, investors may not transfer or sell their interests in
a hedge fund without the hedge fund manager's prior written consent. 106
These restrictions on transferability are the mechanism most hedge
funds use to induce wealthy investors to invest in other funds within the
hedge fund family. 107 The measures to restrict the ability of investors to
transfer their interest in the fund also further the funds' efforts to
preserve their private offerings exemption.
research.com/pdf/HFR StrategyDefinitions.pdf.
98. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 36.
99. See Patrick Darby, Southeast and New England Mean New York: The Rule of
Explicitness and Post-Bankruptcy Interest on Secured Debt, 38 CUMB. L. REv. 467, 469
n.6 (2008).
100. See Riley, supra note 93 ("you could call most of them speculators").
101. Burton G. Malkiel & Antanu Saha, Hedge Funds: Risk and Return, 61(6) FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 80 (2005).
102. Id.
103. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at ix.
104. Citigroup Alternative Investments, Hedge Fund Primer: A Guide to Investing
in Hedge Funds (2004), available athttp://www.smithbamey.com/pdf/HedgeFund
Prime_0305.pdf [hereinafter Hedge Fund Primer] (stating most hedge funds disclose the
lockup period of six months to five years during which an investment cannot be
redeemed).
105. Id.
106. See Oesterle Report, supra note 70, at p. 4 n.22.
107. Id.
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B. Hedge Funds Distinguished from Mutual Funds
Although hedge funds and mutual funds are both pooled investment
vehicles, the similarity between the two types of funds ends there.
Hedge funds' legal structures, management, size, investor qualification
requirements and regulation differ dramatically from mutual funds. 1
08
Mutual funds are heavily regulated. The Investment Company
Act'0 9  applies to mutual funds."0  It requires all mutual funds to
register,"' limit insider transactions,1 12 maintain sufficient liquidity for
investor redemption requests" 3 and adhere to portfolio pricing rules." 4
The Act effectively imposes debt aversion on mutual funds by imposing
very restrictive leverage limitations on registered mutual fund
companies. 115 Furthermore, mutual fund companies are prohibited from
buying securities on margin, 1 6 and shorting".7  stocks. 118  The
Investment Company Act explains, "the national public interest and the
interest of investors are adversely affected" when the interests of fund
insiders and those they contract with, among others, prevail over, "the
59119interest of all classes of such companies' security holders....
Disclosure is a key component of the Investment Company Act's
regulatory regime for the mutual fund industry. 120  Mutual funds are
108. See Hedge Fund Primer, supra note 104.
109. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (2006).
110. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (2006) (covering board of directors and elections).
111. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006).
112. See §§ 80a-9, 80a-10, 80a-12, 80a-17 (limiting transactions with affiliated
persons as employees, directors, overlapping ownership, and prohibited transactions).
113. See § 80a-22 (covering purchase and sale of shares in the company).
114. See id.
115. Section 1 of the Act provides, in relevant part, that "the national public interest
and the interest of investors are adversely affected ... (7) when investment companies
by excessive borrowing and the issuance of excessive amounts of senior securities
increase unduly the speculative character of their junior securities ...." § 80a- 1(b). See
also §§ 80a-18(a), 80a-18(f) (2006) (specifying debt requirements applicable to closed-
end funds and open-end funds).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(1) (2006).
117. See supra note 97 and the accompanying discussion.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a)(3).
119. Id. § 80a-l(b)(2).
120. See, e.g., Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option, For
Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No.
8998; Investment Company Act Release No. 28,584 (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 232,
239, 274 (2009)) (promulgating new mutual fund disclosure rules which require the
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required to disclose... some information about their portfolio
holdings, 122 such as a list of the fund's portfolio securities holdings as of
the date of the particular report, on a biannual basis.123 Only seven of
the top 25 largest mutual fund companies allow investors to examine
their full portfolios more frequently. 
24
C. Federal Exemptions Allow Hedge Funds to Avoid Regulation
Federal securities laws restrict the ability to invest in hedge funds to
wealthy or sophisticated investors, defined under the Securities Act as
accredited investors.1 25 Hedge funds, by contrast, fall under many
provision of a plain English prospectus).
121. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29(e) (2006).
122. See SEC, Investing Wisely, http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last
visited Oct. 7, 2009) (stating investors cannot easily ascertain the exact make-up of their
fund portfolio at any given time).
123. See David Dietz, What's the Big Secret About Mutual Fund Holdings,
THESTREET.COM, Apr. 26, 2000, http://www.thestreet.com/story/925755/whats-the-big-
secret-about-mutual-fund-holdings.html.
124. Id.
125. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission defines "accredited investors"
as:
(1) a bank, insurance company, registered investment company, business development
company, or small business investment company; (2) an employee benefit plan,
within the meaning of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, if a bank,
insurance company, or registered investment adviser makes the investment decisions,
or if the plan has total assets in excess of $5 million; (3) a charitable organization,
corporation, or partnership with assets exceeding $5 million; (4) a director, executive
officer, or general partner of the company selling the securities; (5) a business in
which all the equity owners are accredited investors; (6) a natural person who has
individual net worth, or joint net worth with the person's spouse, that exceeds $1
million at the time of the purchase; (7) a natural person with income exceeding
$200,000 in each of the two most recent years or joint income with a spouse
exceeding $300,000 for those years and a reasonable expectation of the same income
level in the current year; or (8) a trust with assets in excess of $5 million, not formed
to acquire the securities offered, whose purchases a sophisticated person makes.
SEC, Rule 501 of Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)
(2009); see also Charles Stein, The Smart Money Is Going into Hedge Funds, But How
Smart Is It?, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2004, at F1 ("hedge funds are only available to
institutional investors and only the most wealthy individuals"). However, the
popularity of hedge funds may eventually undermine their performance by decreasing
profit margins. See id. ("[t]he return will gradually decline until they get to be very
uninteresting" (quoting Jack Meyer, President of Harvard Management, the investment
arm of Harvard University)).
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Securities Act exemptions from SEC regulation. 126 The exceptions
involve institutional or wealthy accredited individuals, 27  and in
particular, the Securities Act provides exemptions for private placement
offerings. 28 These offerings are securities not offered to the general
public rather they are offered privately to wealthy accredited or
institutional investors who have the ability to assess the risk of the
particular security offered. Private placement offerings are exempt under
section 4(2) of the Securities Act. 2 9 The Securities Act creates certain
safe harbors which afford private placement issuers the protection of the
section 4(2) exemption, if the requisite guidelines set forth by SEC rules,
commonly referred to as Regulation D, are observed. 3 0
126. See Ordower, supra note 87, at 324.
127. See id. at 324-25.
128. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d(1), (2) (2006); see also Gustafson v. Alloyd
Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 591 (1995).
129. Section 4 of the Securities Act, Exempted Transactions, provides in relevant
part, that the provisions of Section 5 shall not apply to:
(1) transactions by any person other than an issuer, underwriter, or dealer.
(2) transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering.
(3) transactions by a dealer (including an underwriter no longer acting as an
underwriter in respect of the security involved in such transaction), except-
(4) brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on any exchange or in the
over-the-counter market but not the solicitation of such orders.
(5)(A) Transactions involving offers or sales of one or more promissory notes directly
secured by a first lien on a single parcel of real estate upon which is located a
dwelling or
(B) Transactions between any of the entities described in subparagraph (A)(i) or
(A)(ii) involving non-assignable contracts to buy or sell the foregoing securities.., or
(C) The exemption provided by subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall not apply to resales
of the securities acquired pursuant thereto ....
(6) transactions involving offers or sales by an issuer solely to one or more accredited
investors ....
Securities Act of 1933, Section 4(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).
130. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2009). Rule 506 of Regulation D is considered a
"safe harbor" for the private offering exemption of Section 4(2) of the Securities Act.
See SEC, Rule 506 of Regulation D, http://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm (last
visited Sept. 10, 2009). Companies using the Rule 506 exemption can raise an unlimited
amount of money. Id. A company can be assured it is within the Section 4(2) exemption
by satisfying the following standards:
The company cannot use general solicitation or advertising to market the
securities;
The company may sell its securities to an unlimited number of "accredited
investors" and up to 35 other purchases. Unlike Rule 505, all non-accredited
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Qualified private offerings are only marketed to institutional or
accredited investors. In order to fall within the safe harbor of Rule 506,
hedge funds are prohibited from marketing, or using any type of general
solicitation or general advertising... to the general public. '32 The SEC
applies a pre-existing, substantive relationship' standard when it
determines whether a hedge fund violated the general solicitation rule.
The standard is analogous to a strict liability standard. Once the SEC
determines a hedge fund made a non-solicited advertisement to at least
one investor in the fund, the hedge fund automatically loses the
exemption. 13 4 Mindful of this rule, hedge funds are very careful not to
violate the SEC general solicitation requirements; they do not send out
glossy brochures to prospective investors or provide detailed
information about their trading philosophy on their websites. Hedge
funds provide limited disclosure materials to potential investors after
investors, either alone or with a purchaser representative, must be sophisticated-that
is, they must have sufficient knowledge and experience in financial and business
matters to make them capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment;
Companies must decide what information to give to accredited investors, so long
as it does not violate the antifraud prohibitions of the federal securities laws. But
companies must give non-accredited investors disclosure documents that are generally
the same as those used in registered offerings. If a company provides information to
accredited investors, it must make this information available to non-accredited
investors as well;
The company must be available to answer questions by prospective purchasers;
Financial statement requirements are the same as for Rule 505; and
Purchasers receive "restricted" securities, meaning that the securities cannot be
sold for at least a year without registering them.
Id. While companies using the Rule 506 exemption do not have to register their
securities and usually do not have to file reports with the SEC, they must file what is
known as a "Form D" after they first sell their securities. Form D is a brief notice that
includes the names and addresses of the company's owners and stock promoters, but
contains little other information about the company. Id.
131. Securities Act Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2009); see also Doug
Cornelius, Advertising or Solicitation to Offer or Sell Securities Under Rule 502(c),
COMPLIANCEBUILDING.COM, May 12, 2009, http://www.compliancebuilding.com/2009/
05/12/advertising-or-solicitation-to-offer-or-sell-securities-occur-under-rue-502c/.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2009).
133. See Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 282988 (May
29, 1997). The letter establishes that a pre-existing relationship must exist between a
hedge fund and its investor at least thirty (30) days before the investor may invest in the
fund. Id.
134. See id. at *3, n.8.
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confirming that the potential investors satisfy the funds investment
profile. In order to qualify for these exemptions, hedge funds are
prohibited from advertising to the general public and may only accept
investment capital from institutional or wealthy accredited investors.
Perhaps the most important loophole hedge funds exploit is located
within the Investment Company Act's definition of an 'investment
company.' Exempt from the Act's reach are funds with less than one
hundred investors135 or those available only to "qualified purchasers," a
group made up of wealthy or substantial institutional and (often)
sophisticated investors.' 36 A hedge fund which falls outside the Act's
scope is free to engage in short selling 3 7 and 'lever up' the
investments 138 through substantial borrowing, known as 'leverage.
' 139
Such speculative, esoteric and exotic transactions are 'off-limits' to
regulated investment companies. In addition, hedge funds are exempt
from the Commodity and Futures Trading Commission's rules
governing "commodity pools."
40
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7)(B)(i) (2006).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A) (2006) (defining qualified purchasers as
individuals who own over $5 million in investments or companies with over $25
million in investments).
137. ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS: THE EASY WAY TO GET
STARTED 4-5 (McGraw-Hill 2000) (stating that mutual funds must comply with SEC
regulations which limit and prohibit certain strategies which hedge funds may engage
in-such as short selling and over leveraging); see Investopedia.com, supra note 97
(defining short selling as "[t]he selling of a security that the seller does not own, or any
sale that is completed by the delivery of a security borrowed by the seller").
138. See David Harper, Hedge Funds Hunt for Upside, Regardless of the Market,
INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/03/112603.asp.
139. See Investopedia.com, Leverage, http://www.investopedia.comlterms/l
leverage.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2009) ("[T]he use of various financial instruments or
borrowed capital, such as margin, to increase the potential return of an investment.").
140. See 17 C.F.R. § 4.5(a)(4) (2009). The CFTC rule exempts commodity pools
that sell only to sophisticated participants defined as "accredited investors under
Regulation D" or "qualified purchasers under the Investment Company Act." See U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Commodity Pool Operator and Commodity
Trading Advisor Exemptions and Exclusions, available at http://www.cftc.gov/
industryoversight/intermediaries/cpoctaexemptionsexclusions.html. Hedge funds
further avoid regulation under Employee Retirement Income Security ACT ("ERISA"),
because hedge funds limit the ownership interests that an employee benefits plan may
possess to less than 25% of the fund, thereby avoiding regulation. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
101(f)(1) (2009). See also Hedge Fund Law Blog, Overview of Issues Related to
ERISA Hedge Fund Investments (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com/
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Hedge funds are indirectly regulated through federal laws
governing banks, insurance companies and broker-dealers from whom
the hedge funds trade and borrow. U.S. Treasury Department
regulations limit the ability of banks to lend to hedge funds by limiting
the amount of money that banks may lend to hedge funds as a
percentage of the hedge fund's total assets. 41  Banks must comply with
minimum, risk-based capital reserves under the Basel Capital Accord,
and they are subject to inspection and examination by bank examiners
who determine if a bank's risk is over-extended. 142 These capital
reserves requirements and risk assessment analysis are designed to limit
the amount of money that banks may lend to hedge funds, as well as the
potential risks to which banks may be exposed as result of their
investment or transactions hedge funds.
Despite their pervasive presence in the financial services industry,
hedge funds are completely dependent upon other entities for their very
existence. In fact, they depend almost entirely on regulated companies
overview-of-issues-related-to-erisa-hedge-fund-investments.html.
141. See 12 C.F.R. § 32.3(a) (2009). This statute provides, in relevant part, that a
bank may not lend more than 15% of its asset value to any one borrower. Id. Banks may
mark an additional 10% of its capital to one borrower if the additional funds are secured
by readily marketable collateral which is statutorily defined as an asset that is fairly
liquid or exchange traded. Id; see also 12 C.F.R. § 32.2(n) (2009).
142. See generally Bank for International Settlements, Basel II: Revised
International Capital Framework, http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca.htm (last visited Sept.
14, 2009). After the implosion of Long-Term Capital Management, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision issued recommendations on managing counterparty
risk. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANKS' INTERACTIONS WITH
HIGHLY LEVERAGED INSTITUTIONS: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE'S
SOUND PRACTICES PAPER (2000). Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors, the SEC, and the U.S. Department of Treasury, and a working group of
twelve major banks (including Bankers Trust, Bear Steams, Chase Manhattan, Goldman
Sachs, Deutsche Bank, J.P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley,
Dean Witter, and Solomon Smith Barney) formed a Counterparty Risk Management
Policy Group ("CRPG") to analyze hedge funds impact on the markets. See
COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP, IMPROVING COUNTERPARTY RISK
MANAGEMENT PRACTICE (1999). The CRPG issued a similar set of recommendations
on managing counter-party risk when dealing with hedge funds. Id. The CRPG's
recommendations were incorporated in th6 Federal Reserve Supervisory Guidance and
Examination Procedures. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, BASEL I
AND THE EVOLUTION OF CAPITAL REGULATION: MOVING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK
(2003).
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for vital services, such as investment banking, prime brokerage,
143
insurance and lending. Additionally, investment banks and broker-dealer
firms often prime brokerage services to hedge funds.
Prime brokerage services were created to meet the needs of the
hedge fund industry because hedge funds where unable to enter and
clear large trading transactions on their own. Not surprisingly, a number
of large investment banks and broker-dealers sought to meet hedge
funds' needs by serving as prime brokers in exchange for handsome
fees. As investment banks and broker-dealers discovered the amount of
money that hedge funds were generating from their transactions, many
investment banking and broker-dealers seduced by the extraordinary
returns that hedge funds were generating, established hedge fund
subsidiaries of their own. These hedge fund subsidiaries did not need to
comply with federal regulations to which their parents were subject."
As such, bank-owned hedge fund subsidiaries were liberated from U.S.
Treasury Department regulations, Federal Reserve Board lending
restrictions, and Basel Capital Reserve requirements. The current
financial crisis can in relevant part be traced to the development of bank-
owned investment hedge funds that provided liquidity and/or securitized
sub-prime mortgaged-backed securities.
Fortunately, federal securities laws do not exempt hedge funds from
anti-fraud provision of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, or state
securities anti-fraud laws such as New York State's Martin Act. The
Securities Exchange Section 10(b), Rule lOb-5 and the insider-trading
prohibitions promulgated thereunder 145 also apply to hedge funds.
Hedge funds may not make any false or materially misleading
143. "Prime Brokerage Services" are defined as a special group of services that
many brokerages give to special clients. The services provided under prime brokering
are securities lending, leveraged trade executions, and cash management, among other
things. Prime brokerage services are provided by most of the large brokers, such as
Goldman Sachs, Paine Webber, and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. Hedge funds were
what started the prime brokerage option. Hedge funds placed large trades and need
special attention from brokerages. Investopedia.com, Prime Brokerage Services,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/primebrokerage.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2009).
See also Richard R. Lindsey, Tips for Choosing a Prime Broker (Bear Steams Securities
Corp.), available at http://www.globalclearing.com/gcsportal/pdf/tipsprimebroker.pdf.
144. See Investopedia.com, Shadow Banking System, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/s/shadow-banking-system.asp (last visited Sept. 18, 2009) (stating hedge-fund
intermediaries of banks are not regulated).
145. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2009).
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statements regarding their investments. 146 The Exchange Act requires
publicly traded companies to report "nontrivial" positions held in off-
balance sheet entities with the SEC 147 and report on quarterly basis
investments of $100 million or more invested in off-balance sheet
entities. 148 Furthermore, the Investment Advisers Act deems hedge fund
managers to be legal fiduciaries. 49  As a legal fiduciary, hedge fund
managers must place the interest of the hedge fund, and investors of the
hedge fund, before their own personal interest.
Nonetheless, some hedge funds engaged in questionable, and
sometimes fraudulent, transactions which harmed investors or the
general public. 5 0 The line between questionable and fraudulent conduct
within the context of the federal securities or common law is blurry. The
key question is does an overly zealous hedge fund manager's promise of
an outrageously high return to investors rise to the level of
misrepresentation and fraud?' 5 ' Some cases, such Bayou Capital, which
failed in 2004, are clearly within the realm of fraud. Bayou's principals
disappeared, leaving investors with significant losses. ' Eventually,
146. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1) (2006).
147. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(f)(1) (2009); see also Shadab, supra note 74, at 1-2.
148. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13(0(1) (2009); see also Shadab, supra note 74, at 1-2. The
Exchange Act provides, in relevant part:
Every institutional investment manager which exercises investment discretion with
respect to accounts holding section 13(f) securities, as defined in paragraph (c) of this
section, having an aggregate fair market value on the last trading day of any month of
any calendar year of at least $100,000,000 shall file a report on Form 13F (§ 249.325
of this Chapter) with the Commission within 45 days after the last day of such
calendar year and within 45 days after the last day of each of the first three calendar
quarters of the subsequent calendar year.
17 C.F.R. § 240.13(f)(1)(a)(1) (2009).
149. See Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714, 74,716 n.22 (Dec.
24, 2003).
150. See generally GARY WEISS, WALL STREET VERSUS AMERICA THE RAMPANT
GREED AND DISHONESTY THAT IMPERIL YOUR INVESTMENTS (Portfolio 2006)
(describing the various techniques that the financial industry, including hedge funds use
to prey on small investors).
151. Will Shanley, Police Arrest 3 for Alleged Hedge Fund Fraud, DENVER POST,
May 17, 2006, at CO 1 (stating that two men were arrested for defrauding investors of
approximately $7.5 million-the investors were mesmerized by the false promise of big
returns).
152. Gretchen Morgenson, What Really Happened at Bayou, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17,
2005, at Cl.
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some of the principals were apprehended, and pled guilty to conspiracy
and fraud charges.' 3 The 2003 civil charges filed by Spitzer against
Canary Capital Partners, LLC arguably, arose from fraudulent conduct
as well. The New York Attorney General's complaint alleged the
Canary funds late trading and market timing mutual fund shares was
fraudulent and illegal. 154 These actions breached the trust of Canary's
investors, who were unaware their capital facilitated such conduct.
Instances such as Bayou and Canary raise questions about the legitimacy
of hedge funds' complex trading strategies. They also fuel skeptics'
suspicions hedge funds' purported aversion to disclosing "proprietary"
trading strategies is, in fact, a cover for more sinister activity. 55
During the past decade many hedge funds have posted phenomenal
returns. 156 These returns, however, are arguably attributable to the fact
hedge funds were exempt from federal regulation and free engage in
questionable trading practices unavailable to other market participants. It
is unfortunate no substantive congressional hedge fund regulatory
proposals emerged until the current financial disaster. Perhaps Professor
Karmel's argument is correct:
... in the absence of a new crisis involving derivatives, excessive
leverage in the market or manipulative activities by institutional
investors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC or any other financial
regulator will decide to study and reform institutional investors'
behavior. 157
It is as if Congress had learnt nothing from the Long Term Capital
Management 5 8 and Enron159 debacles. The reevaluation of the wisdom
153. Hedge Fund Founder, CFO Plead Guilty in Fraud Case, Losses Estimated at
$450 Million in Bayou Scandal, CHICAGO TPiB., Sept. 30, 2005, at C3.
154. Complaint, New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC (Sept. 3, 2003),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2003/sep/canarycomplaint.pdf
[hereinafter Canary Complaint].
155. See Daniel L. Liffman, Registration of Hedge Fund Advisers Under the
Investment Advisers Act, 38 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 214 (2005) (arguing that the increase
popularity of hedge funds have a direct correlation to increase in fraud, whish hurts
small investors and negatively impacts the markets).
156. But see text accompanying notes 99-102, supra.
157. See Karmel, supra note 78, at 948, and accompanying text.
158. Long Term Capital Management was a hedge started in 1994 with much
fanfare about its technical trading strategies. It had two Nobel laureates in economics
on its board-Robert Merton and Myron Scholes. It maintained a 28-to-1 leverage of
its portfolio. Long Term imploded in 1998 by losing approximately $2.3 billion in a
matter of months. See id.
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of unfettered markets prompted by the recent financial crisis presents
Congress with a wonderful opportunity to adopt clear unambiguous
hedge fund regulation. Reformative and preventative measures are
necessary to adequately protect American investors.
Until recently, a laissez faire16 trend permeated discussions about
hedge fund regulation. Former SEC Chairman Cox testified before
Congress that "to the maximum extent possible, our actions regarding
hedge fund regulation should be non-intrusive."' 61 While President of
the New York Federal Reserve, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner
stated that hedge funds should be regulated. 162 This laissezfaire attitude
is all the more alarming when considered in the light of the financial
implosions of Long-Term Capital and Enron. True to form, the
aftermath of Enron led Congress to adopt Sarbanes-Oxley 63 to protect
against bad corporate governance and to reassure investors that it was
159. Enron began in 1985 as a company that shipped natural gas through pipelines,
but it changed in the next sixteen years to one of the nation's most dominant energy
traders. BBC, Enron Timeline, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in depth/
business/2002/enron/timeline/default.stm. Enron allegedly dealt in illegal, off-the-
balance-sheet transactions and partnerships, which allowed the company to conceal its
growing debt problem. See Complaint, SEC v. Fastow, Civil Action No. H-02-3666
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002). Enron high-level executives may have known about the
company's financial issues and woes for some time. Former Vice President for
Corporate Development Sherron Watkins warned Enron's Chief Executive Officer of
impending financial problems based on a number of accounting scandals in August
2001. Financial Collapse of Enron Corp.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
& Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 108th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2002)
(statement of Sherron Watkins, Vice President of Corporate Development, Enron
Corp.).
160. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 981 (4th ed.
2000).
161. Regulation of Hedge Funds: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, SEC) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/
ts072506cc.htm) [hereinafter Cox Statement].
162. See J. Bradford DeLong's Grasping Reality with All Eight Tentacles,
http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2007/07/regulating-hedg.html (July 24, 2007, 21:29
PST).
163. The official title of the bill is "An Act to protect investors by improving the
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws,
and for other purposes." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C, 15 U.S.C., 18
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
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safe to invest.1 64
III. FEDERAL REGULATORS' CONCERN REGARDING
CERTAIN HEDGE FUND ACTIVITY
Markets would....possibly cease to function.
-William J. McDonough1
65
Federal regulators' authority is not absolute. The SEC 166 is limited
to the authority granted to it under the Securities Act, 167 the Securities
Exchange Act,168 the Investment Company Act, 169 the Investment
Advisers Act,' 7" and the Rules promulgated thereunder. Likewise, the
CFTC 7' authority is limited to the powers granted to it under the
Commodities Exchange Act 7 2 and the Rules promulgated thereunder.
The Federal Reserve Board's 173 power is limited to the authority granted
164. 149 CONG. REc. S12976 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Levin) (to
restore trust in the financial markets after the Enron "debacle"). Sarbanes-Oxley is a
broad package of federal legislation intended to rein in corporate executives run amok
and restores investor confidence. Unlike most of the federal initiatives that preceded it,
Sarbanes-Oxley established some mandatory rules governing the internal affairs of
publicly listed corporations. In particular, Sarbanes-Oxley includes changes to many
different areas of the law: (1) accounting and auditing procedures, (2) financial
disclosures, (3) corporate tax law, (4) securities law, and (5) bankruptcy law. The
Sarbanes-Oxley's goal is to guarantee "trust in the financial markets by ensuring that
the corporate fraud and greed may be better detected, prevented and prosecuted" and to
"ensure that such greed does not succeed." See S. REP. No. 107-146 (2002), 2002 WL
863249, at *2 (statement of Senator Leahy) [hereinafter Leahy Statement] (stating that
the Act is intended to restore trust in the financial markets after the Enron "debacle").
165. Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking &
Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of William J. McDonough,
President, Federal Reserve Bank of New York).
166. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
167. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (2006).
168. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78oo (2006).
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (2006).
170. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-22 (2006).
171. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
172. Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, 7 U.S.C. § 15 (2006).
173. The Federal Reserve System serves as the nation's central bank. The System
consists of a seven member Board of Governors with headquarters in Washington,
D.C., and twelve Reserve Banks located in major cities throughout the United States.
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to it under Federal Reserve Act 7 4 and the Rules promulgated
thereunder. The enormous impact of hedge funds' activities on the
equity and financial markets calls the wisdom of such restrictions on
regulators' authority into question.
A. Hedge Fund Growth and Public Investors
An enormous swath of Americans is indirectly exposed to hedge
fund investments as beneficiaries of pension funds or institutional
endowments. Large public pension funds, such as CALPERS, 175 and
private pension funds, like Harvard's Sowood Management, 176 invest in
hedge funds either directly or indirectly. CALPERS and Sowood
Management are institutional investors as defined under the Securities
Act. 177  CALPERS and Sowood Management invest on behalf of
millions of working-class Americans, who depend on the performance
of the instutitions' investments to fund their retirement.
Unsurprisingly, the SEC promulgated a package of new rules in
Primary responsibility of the Board members is the formulation of monetary policy.
The Board sets reserve requirements and shares the responsibility with the Reserve
Banks for discount rate policy. These two functions plus open market operations
constitute the monetary policy tools of the Federal Reserve System. In addition to
monetary policy responsibilities, the Federal Reserve Board has regulatory and
supervisory responsibilities over banks that are members of the System, bank holding
companies, international banking facilities in the United States, Edge Act and
agreement corporations, foreign activities of member banks, and the U.S. activities of
foreign-owned banks. The Board is also responsible for the development and
administration of regulations that implement major federal laws governing consumer
credit such as the Truth in Lending Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act and the Truth in Savings Act. See Federal Reserve Board, The
Structure of the Federal Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/frseries/
frseri.htm.
174. See generally 12 U.S.C. ch.3.
175. The California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) is a defined
benefit retirement plan that manages pension and health benefits for approximately 1.5
million California public employees, retirees, and their families. CalPERS provide
benefits based on a member's years of service, age, and highest compensation. Benefits
are also provided for disability and death. CalPERS, Facts at a Glance: General (Oct.
10, 2009), http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/facts/general.pdf.
176. See Jenny Strasburg & Katherine Burton, Sowood Funds Lose More Than 50%
as Debt Markets Fall (Update 4), BLOOMBERG, July 31, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=a5He2yCtHjJE.
177. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b-(a)(15)(i) (2006).
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2004 to regulate the hedge fund industry. 178 The proposed rules
recognized hedge funds' outsized impact on the securities industry. 179
Larger hedge funds would become subject to the Investment Advisers
Act.180 Congress held extensive hearings and roundtable discussions
with state regulators to determine whether the proposed hedge fund rule
was adequate.' 8' In adopting this new hedge fund rule in 2005, the SEC
extended its oversight over the $1.5 trillion hedge fund industry. 182
The proposed hedge fund rule required all qualifying hedge funds
to meet the registration requirements by February 1, 2006. The
proposed hedge fund rule attempted to amend hedge fund' advisers
method of counting that allowed hedge fund advisers to fall within the
scope of the "private adviser exemption" under the Investment Adviser
Act.'83 Traditionally, the Investment Adviser Act exempted investment
advisers who had fifteen clients or less counted within the hedge fund
entity itself.184  In essence, an investment adviser could have 499
individual investors in a hedge fund but not be required to register
because the investment adviser was advising only "one client" - the
hedge fund.'85 However, the moment a hedge fund had 500 investors
(which it rarely did); it was required to register with the SEC.
Additionally, hedge fund advisers whose principal offices and places of
business were within the United States, and who managed at least $25
178. See Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Funds Advisers,
Investment Advisers Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter Hedge Fund Rule].
179. See generally Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Address at the
Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference: Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon-
Don't Shoot the Messenger (June 18, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/2009/spch0618091aa.htm).
180. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-3.
181. See Hedge Funds and Capital Markets: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Capital Markets, Insurance & Investment Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing. & Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. 8 (2006) (statement of Randal Quarles,
Undersecretary for Domestic Finance) (stating that the Treasury Department will
examine in detail whether the growth of hedge funds holds the potential to change the
overall level or nature of risk in our markets).
182. Michael Steinhardt, Do You Really Need a Hedge Fund?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14,
2006, at A16.
183. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1, 80b-3(b)(1) to (b)(6) (2006).
184. See § 80b-3(b)(3).
185. See id.
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million in assets, were required to register with the SEC.' 86 This was a
marked change from the SEC's previous rule exempting investment
advisers from registering with the SEC, if the adviser managed no more
than $25 million of a fund that was located within the United States. '87
Additionally, the proposed hedge fund rule created a "look
through" provision, which required hedge fund advisers to count each
individual owner of a private fund as a client for purposes of
determining whether the private adviser exemption applied. As such, a
hedge fund that had more than fourteen investors in the previous twelve
months would no longer qualify for a private adviser exemption, and
would need to register with the SEC. Previously, the Investment
Adviser Act exempted entities that had "fewer than fifteen clients" from
registering with the SEC.' 88 Most investment advisers to hedge funds
were exempt from the requirements of the Investment Adviser Act
because the advisers intentionally limited their advisory services to less
than 15 clients. Under the proposed hedge fund rule most hedge fund
advisers would have to register with the SEC if the funds they advises
had fifteen or more individual "shareholders, limited partners, members,
or beneficiaries." 189
Additionally, the SEC noted that pension funds that invest in hedge
funds have a fiduciary duty to ensure that pensioners' investments are
not placed at risk through reckless investments.' 90 Fiduciary duty is the
fundamental hallmark of any relationship in which trust is the
cornerstone of the relationship. In reliance upon such trust, the fiduciary
is entrusted with the financial care giving of another. Certainly, pension'
funds fiduciary duties required them to conduct appropriate due
diligence inquiries about the types of investment strategies used by a
hedge fund. This must be a prerequisite to a pension fund manager
making an investment in a hedge fund. However, a question arises as to
whether hedge funds provide adequate disclosure to allow pension fund
manager to adequately satisfy their fiduciary duties.
186. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(A).
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(1).
188. See id § 80b-3(b)(3).
189. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a) (2009).
190. See, e.g., AM. JUR. 2D Pensions and Retirement Funds § 454 (1988).
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B. SEC Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds
The SEC offered several rationales for regulating hedge funds.
First, the SEC cited the exponential growth of hedge funds industry as a
basis for adopting hedge fund regulation. At the time there were
approximately 8,350 active hedge funds that control $875 billion in
assets.' 91 The hedge fund industry had experienced capital inflows of
approximately $126.5 billion in 2006.192 Hedge fund capital inflow
accounted for "$16.4 billion dollars in the first quarter of 2008."'193 In
2006 alone, nearly 2,000 new hedge funds began operation. 194  The
inverse is also true, however. Many hedge funds shut down without
providing their investors with any notice. 195 In 2005, nearly 600 hedge
funds failed. 196 The impact of a hedge fund's failure on its investors can
be fatal especially when the investor is a pension fund comprised of
retirement savings.
Such fears about the risks to average investors proved justified.
Hedge funds' trading strategies did not result in sufficient profit to fulfill
their existing or future trading obligations, and created a substantial
burden on hedge funds' trading counter-parties to fulfill. Counterparties
are almost always publicly-traded companies, which must either absorb
the loss, or default on the existing or future trading obligations. It is a
financial domino effect - as one hedge fund fails or defaults on existing
trading obligation, its creates defaults with counter-parties, which causes
defaults with other counter-parties with trading contracts. As such,
hedge fund failures create cross-defaults, 197 in the financial and
191. See id.
192. See Aaron Siegel, Hedge Funds Rake in $126.5 Billion, INVESTMENT NEWS,
Jan. 17, 2007 (stating that hedge fund inflows for the quarter were $15.8 billion that
brought in a record $126.5 billion for the year).
193. Posting to DaveManuel.com, http://www.davemanuel.com/2008/09/03/hedge-
fimd-capital-inflows-have-slowed-to-a-trickle-in-2008/ (Sept. 13, 2009, 23:41 EST).
194. Cox Statement, supra note 163, at 8.
195. See generally The Hedge Fund Implode-O-Meter, http://hf-
implode.com/imploded.html (listing of hedge funds that have imploded since late
2006).
196. Hedge Fund Realities, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at A18.
197. Investopedia.com, Cross Default, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cross
default.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining cross-defaults or cross acceleration as
"provisions in a bond indenture or loan agreement that puts the borrower in default if
the borrower defaults on another obligation").
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securities markets which, in turn, create market liquidity'98 problems or
market credit199 complications. This is why hedge funds have such a
significant impact on the financial and securities markets. For example,
the current financial crisis that began in October 2008 can trace its
origins to the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.200 The
inability of regulators to ascertain the true state of Lehman's finances, in
light of the uncertain value of the bank's extensive holdings of esoteric
derivatives contracts and counterparty liabilities impeded their efforts to
rescue the firm. Ultimately all investors and the entire global economy
suffered devastating losses, at least in part, because hedge fund style
trading instruments were so interconnected with the broader economy.
The second reason the SEC offered for adopting hedge fund
regulation was the correlation of significant growth and allegation of
fraud by hedge fund investors and subsequent hedge fund enforcement
actions commenced by the SEC and a number of state securities
regulators. 20 ' Enforcement actions increased against hedge funds
because hedge funds began to impact the securities and financial
markets. The impact was felt both in terms of hedge fund failures, and
the growing number of unsophisticated investors who were able to
invest in hedge funds. As previously noted in this article, hedge fund
failures created significant ripple effects in the markets because of the
cross-defaults, liquidity and credit crunches their failure triggered. The
unsophisticated investor is in danger because hedge fund advisers
198. Investorwords.com, Liquidity, http://www.investorwords.com/2837/liquidity.
html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining liquidity as the "ability of an asset to be
converted into cash quickly and without any price discount").
199. Investorwords.com, Credit, http://www.investorwords.com/l193/credit.html
(last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining credit as the "borrowing capacity of an individual
or company").
200. See, e.g., Justin Fox, The Bailout's Biggest Flaw, TIME, Sept. 28, 2009, at 44;
David Ellis, Lehman Brothers Collapse Stuns Global Markets, CNN.coM, Sept. 15,
2008, http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/09/15/lehman.merrill.stocks.turmoil/
index.html; Posting of Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis to Corporate Justice Blog,
http://corporatejusticeblog.blogspot.com/2009/09/remembering-lehman-on-eve-of-
first.html (Sept. 8, 2009 16:32 EST).
201. See, e.g., Jeffrey Robins & Steven Lofchie, Regulation of Private Funds (May
1, 2008), available at http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/article/050108LofchieRobins
RegPriv.pdf ("As the number of hedge funds have grown, so has the number of reported
cases of frauds on investors."). Included in the state regulation enforcement actions are
the actions commenced by the former Office of the New York State Attorney General,
Eliot Spitzer. See id.
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defrauded both hedge fund investors and non-hedge fund investors in
amounts exceeding approximately $2 billion.20 2
The third reason the SEC offered for adopting hedge fund
regulation was the growing and sizable number of small investors,
pensioners and others charitable organizations which were indirectly
investing in hedge funds. Small investor involvement was increasing
because hedge funds were expanding their marketing to attract them.
The hedge funds attracted small investors by decreasing the minimum
investment requirements. Hedge funds offered diversified investment
options in a fund of funds.203 A fund of funds is a portfolio of
uncorrelated hedge funds, bundled together to provide access to a
variety of hedge funds with different investment styles, strategies and
risks. The fund of funds may also be a pension fund, foundation,
university or other charitable organizations that invests in hedge
funds.204 The danger was that the retirement monies of small investors
were exposed to exponential risk, possibly leading to sizeable losses,
which may not have been properly disclosed to the pension fund
investors. The SEC's proposed hedge fund rule sought to remove the
secrecy by which hedge funds operated. Once subjected to federal
disclosure requirement, hedge funds would have to register with the
SEC, submit to discretionary SEC examinations, and the SEC would be
permitted to conduct background investigation of hedge fund advisers to
reveal prior criminal convictions and professional misconduct.205
C. Legal Challenge to Proposed Hedge Fund Rule
In 2006, Phillip Goldstein, the President of Kimball & Winthrop,
202. See Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 180, at 72,056-75 (stating that complex
trading strategies takes advantage of the gap in the federal regulation).
203. See id. at 72,057.
204. SEC, Hedge Funds, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2009) (defining a fund of hedge funds as "an investment company that invests in
hedge finds-rather than investing in individual securities. Some funds of hedge funds
register their securities with the SEC. These funds of hedge funds must provide
investors with a prospectus and must file certain reports quarterly with the SEC.").
205. See Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 178, at 72,078 (providing that the
Commission may screen the adviser and associated individuals, and deny registration if
they have been convicted of a felony or otherwise have a prior disciplinary record
subjecting them to disqualification).
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Inc. challenged the SEC proposed hedge fund registration rule20 6 in
court. The SEC proposed hedge fund rule altered the manner in which
investment advisors counted their clients. Before the SEC proposed a
hedge fund registration rule, hedge fund advisers did not have to register
with the SEC if they had fewer than fifteen clients. The proposed change
in regulation meant that hedge fund managers would be required to
count each investor in a hedge fund, rather than counting only the fund
itself as the client. The ability to count only the fund as the client,
instead of each individual investor in the fund, allowed hedge funds
advisers to stay within the fewer than fifteen client rule.2 °7
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit invalidated the SEC
proposed hedge fund registration rule.208 Judge Randolph, writing for a
unanimous panel, held that the SEC re-definition of the term "client"
was arbitrary, rendering the definition inapposite to the SEC previously
promulgated safe harbor rule, and conflicted with the purpose of the
Investment Adviser Act. 20 9 The SEC argued that determining whether
the proposed hedge fund rule's use of the term "client" was ambiguous
triggered the deferential standard outlined by the Supreme Court in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2'0 The
court rejected the SEC argument, stating that SEC's construction of the
term "client" was unreasonable in light of the court's own interpretation
of the word, the Investment Adviser Act's definition of the term
"investment adviser," and the SEC's prior definition of the term "client"
in the safe harbor rule.21'
Goldstein, emboldened by his court victory, requested an SEC
exemption for Kimball & Winthrop, Inc. from a proposed rule which
would require hedge fund advisers with over $100 million under
management to disclose their equity positions on a quarterly basis.2 ,2
Goldstein believed that his firm's equity positions were intellectual
206. See id. at 72,054.
207. Isaac Ruiz-Carus et al., What Is a Hedge Fund?, University of Iowa Center for
International Finance and Development, available at http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/
faq/Hedge.shtml.
208. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
209. Id. at 879 & n.5.
210. Id. at 878.
211. Id. at 879 & n.5 (finding that the safe harbor rule defined "client" as "the
limited partnership," itself not the individual partners who invest in the limited
partnership).
212. See Scannell et al., supra note 82.
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property that should be protected under federal law rather than disclosed
under it. 213 Federal disclosure requirement for mutual funds currently
mandates that mutual funds disclose their top five portfolio holdings to
their investors at least on a biannual basis.214
The court's ruling in Goldstein v. SEC was incorrect. The
Goldstein court's refusal to accept the SEC argument regarding the
Supreme Court's deferential treatment of agency decision-making,
adopted in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,2 5 conflicts with the purpose of the Investment Advisers Act.
Perhaps more troubling, is the Goldstein Court's refusal to adapt its
jurisprudence to a more flexible adaptive rule-making framework that is
unique to the financial services industry- where the risk of loss, which
is often shifted onto the unsuspecting public, is enormous. The financial
institutions such as banks, insurance companies who execute trades with
hedge funds, often have the financial wherewithal to withstand the
financial fallout when a hedge funds defaults on trade transactions,
which may ultimately lead the hedge fund to fail. However, the
pensioner who indirectly invest in hedge funds do not have the financial
wherewithal to withstand such financial fallout when hedge funds
default on trade transactions and, often pensioners are left holding the
proverbial bag. How federal regulators protect should small investors in
this type of financial quagmire will require innovative regulatory
techniques and expansive scope of current federal financial reporting
requirements to capture hedge fund activity in the markets.
The SEC declined to appeal the Goldstein decision.
Senator Charles Grassley's (R-IA), the former ranking Republican
on the Senate Finance Committee, criticized the SEC for not
aggressively trying to root out potential for illegal insider trading by
hedge funds, rather than proposing a new net worth rule.216 Grassley,
213. See id.
214. Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered
Open-End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8861,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,064, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,790 (proposed Nov. 21,
2007). However, concerns raised by the mutual fund industry regarding the need to
protect a fund and its shareholders from predatory trading that may occur given the
concentration of certain funds in fewer issuers convinced the SEC to leave holdings
disclosure unchanged in the final rule. See id.
215. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
216. Brody Mullins & Kara Scannell, Politics and Economics: Hedge Funds
Coming of Age Politically---Politicians' Growing Scrutiny Coincides with Calls for
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disappointed with Goldstein court's ruling, attempted to reinstate a
registration requirement for hedge fund advisers with the SEC but his
attempt was unsuccessful. 217 It would take Congress three years to re-
consider proposed legislation to directly regulate hedge funds. 1 s
The adverse outcome of Goldstein, at first, appeared to dampen the
SEC's resolve to regulate the hedge fund industry. This sentiment was
compounded when the hedge fund industry responded to the decision by
withdrawing their registration applications from the SEC en masse.
Backing away from an entirely new regime, the SEC tweaked the old
requirements.
The Commission promulgated revised anti-fraud rules, instead. In a
move which the SEC estimated would reduce the number of hedge fund
investors by 88%,219 the Commission increased the net worth
requirement for hedge fund investors.220 It also clarified disclosure
requirements applicable to registered and unregistered investment
advisers to hedge funds and other private investment pools. 21  The
proposed net worth rule makes it unlawful for an investment adviser,
irrespective of its registration status under the Investment Advisers Act
to "make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a
material fact . . . to any investor or prospective investor in a pooled
investment vehicle. ' ' 222 The new anti-fraud rule also prohibits hedge
Cash; Will New PAC Provide Cover?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2007, at A6.
217. David M. Katz, Sen. Grassley Seeks Hedge-Fund Rule, CFO.cOM, Mar. 8,
2007, http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8834476/c 8913455?f-insidecfo.
218. Posting of Zachery Kouwe to Dealbook Blog, Senators Seek to Regulate Hedge
Funds, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/O1/29/senators-seek-to-regulate-hedge-
funds (Jan. 28, 2009, 18:53 EST). The proposed legislation is aptly titled, Hedge Fund
Transparency Act of 2009. On July 16, 2009, the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs held a hearing entitled Regulating Hedge Funds and Other
Private Investment Pools to discuss legislation that would require all hedge fund
advisers and the advisers of private equity and venture capital funds to register with the
SEC. President Obama's administration has also submitted proposed legislation to
regulate hedge funds titled Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.
See id.
219. 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8(a)(1) (2009).
220. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles;
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No.
8766, Investment Advisers Act No. 2576, 72 Fed. Reg. 400 (proposed Jan. 4, 2007)
(Proposed Regulation § 206(4)-8).
221. See 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8(a)(1).
222. Id. § 206(4)-8(a)(1). Compare the language of the general antifraud rule under
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funds from engaging in deceptive or manipulative practices.223
The new regulation is much broader in scope than the lOb-5 general
antifraud rule because it applies even when the statement, omission or
deceptive practice does not accompany the purchase or sale of an
interest in the pooled investment vehicle or any other security.224
Conceptually, this would pull questionable conducts that previously
were outside the scope of lOb-5 anti-fraud rule within its scope. For
example a questionable strategy that hedge funds employ is to publish
negative research reports 225 which they distribute to the public to create
negative impression of the financial viability and management of
targeted publicly-traded companies with AAA credit rating that they
have shorted and against whom hedge funds have purchased substantial
amounts of credit default swaps. Hedge funds target these publicly-
publicly traded companies because these companies are the most
vulnerable to negative news. The stock prices of these targeted
companies can move almost instantaneously based upon such
unsubstantiated widely dispersed negative news.
IV. CERTAIN HEDGE FUND ACTIVITY NEGATIVELY
AFFECTS THE PUBLIC GOOD
Hell, there are no rules here-we 're trying to accomplish something.
-Thomas A. Edison 226
Disclosure and transparency are critical to the balanced operation of
the markets. The current modus operandi of hedge fund non-disclosure
can lead to eminent implosion of the hedge fund industry.227 The
principle purpose of financial regulation is to protect the investing public
from fraud by requiring publicly traded companies to provide adequate
the Exchange Act, Rule IOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
223. 17 C.F.R. § 206(4)-8(a)(2).
224. Id. § 206(4)-8; see discussion of enforcement action in Securities Act Release
No. 8766, supra note 222.
225. See infra Section V.B.
226. LANCE SECRETAN, INSPIRE! WHAT GREAT LEADERS Do 30 (John Wiley & Sons,
Inc. 2004).
227. See Joseph Nocera, Offering Up an Even Dozen Odds and Ends, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2005, at Cl (stating that secrecy is the biggest problem with the hedge fund
industry).
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disclosure through financial reporting regulation such as annual reports,
quarterly reports and other public disclosure filings with the SEC.228 The
secondary purpose of financial regulation is to protect the investing
public from the agency costs associated with the delegation of
investment services and/or decisions to third parties. Investors should
be confident securities' markets are operated to ensure all participants
are treated fairly. Regulation exists to ensure the integrity of the
marketplace.2 29  American investors have come to expect this parens
patriae230 role that government has assumed to protect and serve.
Hedge funds' operations, culture and strategy are antithetical to this
tradition. The hedge fund industry is a closely knit group.231 They all
seem to know each other or know about each other.232 Hedge funds are
not known for readily revealing their investment strategies, positions,
228. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2006). The SEC describes its
function as promoting and facilitating investor access to essential investment related
information by "promoting the disclosure of important market-related information,
maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud." See Investor's Advocate, supra
note 11; see, e.g., DANIEL REINGOLD & JENNIFER REINGOLD, CONFESSIONS OF A WALL
STREET ANALYST: A TRUE STORY OF INSIDE INFORMATION AND CORRUPTION IN THE
STOCK MARKET (2006) (exposing the illegal use of insider information on Wall Street).
229. See David Skeel, Behind the Hedge, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Dec. 2005, at 28 (Dec.
2005) (arguing that the basic integrity of the market, and investment of million of
Americans who think they have nothing to do with hedge funds will be in danger, as
long as the need to take unreasonable risks, and show large returns continues to be
expected from the investing public).
230. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 2009) (defining parens patriae as "a
doctrine by which a government has standing to prosecute a lawsuit on behalf of a
citizen, especially on behalf of someone who is under a legal disability to prosecute the
suit").
231. Riva D. Atlas, Hedge Fund Rumors Rattle Markets, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2005,
at C2 (stating that the secrecy of hedge funds makes a number of investors nervous).
232. See generally David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance:
Advice on Coping with Hedge FundActivism, N.Y. L.J., May 25, 2006, at 5 (stating that
when one hedge fund takes a position in a company, other hedge funds will buy stock
shortly thereafter. When hedge funds act in concert, their behavior is referred to as a
"wolf pack" approach.); see also Andrew Kulpa & Butzel Long, The Wolf in
Shareholder's Clothing: Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game Theory and Voting
Structures to Exploit Corporate Control and Governance, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 78,
97-100 (2005) (arguing that cooperative behavior among hedge funds allows hedge
funds to attack companies in packs; several hedge funds may combine their voting
power to exert governance over a firm or corporation).
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profits or losses. 233  The proprietary trading strategies that they utilize,
each with its own risk level and potential return signature, are not
revealed to the investors, competitors or regulators.3 The secrecy of
hedge funds' operations prompted Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben
Bernanke to describe hedge funds as opaque-in that hedge funds do not
have to disclose their trading strategies to anyone and rely heavily on
secrecy, speed, and leverage to be profitable.235
C. Questionable Investment Strategies Impact Markets
Federal regulators are concerned about the investment funds that
invest in hedge funds-typically called funds of funds.23 6  Funds of
funds usually invest in from fifteen to twenty-five hedge funds at a
time. 237  Funds of funds are defined by their registration status. 23
8
233. See Joseph Nocera, Offering Up an Even Dozen Odds and Ends, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 24, 2005, at CI (stating that it is scary that nobody knows what hedge funds are
doing or how much they are leveraged; it conjures up visions of Long-Term Capital
Management, which put a huge scare into the financial system when it blew up in the
late 1990s).
234. The author had a rare opportunity as a New York State Assistant Attorney
General to interview and depose several hedge funds regarding the legitimacy of certain
research and trading activities. The information gleaned from those interviews and
depositions have been invaluable to my understanding of the inner workings of the
hedge fund world and the trading strategies in which hedge funds engage.
235. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference (May 16, 2006) (transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
bemanke20060516a.htm.
236. Investorwords.com, Funds of Funds, http://www.investorwords.com/2129/
fund-of funds.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (describing a funds of funds as a fund
that invests in other funds).
Just as a mutual fund invests in a number of different securities, a fund of funds holds
shares of many different mutual funds. These funds were designed to achieve even
greater diversification than traditional mutual funds. On the downside, expense fees
on fund of funds are typically higher than those on regular funds because they include
part of the expense fees charged by the underlying funds. In addition, since a fund of
funds buys many different funds which themselves invest in many different stocks, it
is possible for the fund of funds to own the same stock through several different funds
and it can be difficult to keep track of the overall holdings.
Id.
237. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 83, at 67.
238. See generally William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL FIN. 303 (1999) (discussing how hedge funds are organized).
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Commonly three types of fund of funds exist:(1) dual-registered funds,
which are registered as the Securities Act; (2) '40 Act registered, which
are registered under the Investment Company Act and make private
placement offerings, 239 and (3) institutional funds, which are only
offered to institutional investors.240 Federal regulators have a growing
concern about funds of funds availability to small investors via mutual
funds. 24' Funds of funds usually charge a performance fee. As such, all
funds of funds investors must be qualified investors under the Securities
Act, Rule 205-3.242
The SEC has expressed concern regarding the lack of disclosure
that funds of funds provide potential investors, and the limited
disclosure provided to existing investors. 243  The SEC is particularly
concerned about the double and sometimes triple layer of fees that
investors are required to pay. 244 Typically, registered funds of funds pay
a series of layered fees: (1) a management fee to the investment adviser
of 1-2 percent of total assets under management, (2) a performance fee
up to 20% of capital appreciation, and (3) the underlying hedge fund
also pays similar investment fees. 245 Funds of funds do not disclose to
their investors the actual or even the estimated fees incurred.246 In
addition to not disclosing their layered fees, funds of funds do not
disclose their investment positions.247  Registered funds of funds must
disclose their financial statements and positions to investors in semi-
239. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2009).
240. Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 178, at 72,057.
241. Id. (stating that over 50 funds of funds mutual funds intend to offer shares to
the public, in part, because there are no minimum initial investment requirements for
investors of funds of funds with registered investment advisers).
242. Rule 205-3 provides, in relevant part, that each investor must have a net worth
of at least $1.5 million or have at least $750,000 of assets under management with the
adviser. Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,064 (Dec. 10,
2004).
243. Lisa Whitehouse, Corporate Social Responsibility: Views from the Frontline,
63 J. Bus. ETHICS 279 (2006).
244. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 100.
245. See id. at ix.
246. 17 C.F.R. § 274.1 la-1 (2009).
247. See Fund of Funds Investments, Securities Act Release No. 8297, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,198, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,226 (proposed June 24, 2004)
(proposing an amendment to Form N-22).
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annual reports.2 48 However, funds of funds only disclose the underlying
hedge funds in which they have invested, they do not reveal the actual
portfolio holdings in which the underlying hedge funds have invested.249
Additionally, registered funds of funds must disclose their overall
investment strategy and valuation information of a fund of funds'
positions in an underlying hedge fund's portfolio holdings.250
Despite the amazing growth in the hedge fund industry, investors
have begun to witness a certain level of the hedge fund implosion that
may be similar to Long-Term Capital Management's failure, which
required a bailout by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and several
major New York banks. 25 ' This is evidenced by the failure of Amaranth
Advisors, 252 Bailey Coates Cromwell Fund,2 53 and Sowood Capital
Management, a hedge fund started by former Harvard University money
managers that lost $350 million in July 2007, and was forced to sell its
portfolio and return $1.5 billion to investors.254
Hedge funds engage in primarily three types of investment
strategies: (1) directional investing, 255 (2) corporate event-driven
investing,256 and (3) arbitrage.257 Basically, directional investing seeks
to profit from price gains or declines in specific markets by simply
purchasing a security when investors believe that it is going up, and
selling a security when investors believe that the security is going
down. 258 These are not complicated strategies but they are profitable.
248. 17 C.F.R. § 270.30e-1 (2009).
249. Fung & Hsieh, supra note 238, at 299-300.
250. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 92, 99.
251. See Moody's Sees Potential for Big Hedge Fund Failure, REUTERS, Aug. 16,
2007.
252. See Ann Davis et al., What Went Wrong at Amaranth-Mistakes at the Hedge
Fund Include Key Trader's Confusing Paper Gains with Cash Profits, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 20, 2006, at C1.
253. Jim McWhinney, Massive Hedge Fund Failures, INVESTOPEDIA.COM, Nov. 17,
2005, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/05/HedgeFundFailure.asp?&
viewed= 1= 1 &viewed=1.
254. Christopher Rowland, How a Hedge Fund Star Lost It All, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/16/business/worldbusiness/16iht-hedge.
4.7145437.html? r-1.
255. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 58; see also Fung & Hsieh, supra
note 238.
256. Fung & Hsieh, supra note 238.
257. See Shadab, supra note 74, at 38.
258. Investopedia.com, Directional Trading, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/
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Corporate event-driven investing seeks to profit from events like
mergers or bankruptcies. Arbitrage seeks to profit from inefficient price
discrepancies in the various markets such as the Asian markets in
comparison to the European market or the American market.259 In
addition, to these three main investing strategies, thirty percent of hedge
funds employ an equity long-short strategy, which is a mechanism by
which standard stocks are hedged against the volatility of the equity
position losing value by short-selling. 260 The strategy is basically to sell
short the same security by betting that the value of the same asset class
will decrease over a relatively short period of time.
1. Short Selling
Short-selling or shorting has a contentious global history.
Napoleon Bonaparte declared short-selling tantamount to treason
because it interfered with his ability to finance his military efforts. 6'
During World War I, the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") 262
directionaltrading.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (defining directional trading as a
"strategy used by investors [that utilizes] open positions, either long or short, on the
belief that they are able to correctly predict the movement of price in a security").
259. See Shadab, supra note 74, at 38.
260. SEC, Short Sale, http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm (last visited Oct.
12, 2009) (defining a short sale as the sale of a security that the seller does not own or
that the seller owns but does not deliver). In order to deliver the security to the
purchaser, the short seller will borrow the security, typically from a broker-dealer or an
institutional investor. The short seller later closes out the position by returning the
security to the lender, typically by purchasing equivalent securities on the open market.
In general, short selling is utilized to profit from an expected downward price
movement, or to hedge the risk of a long position in the same security or in a related
security. See id; ROBERT A. JAEGER, ALL ABOUT HEDGE FUNDS 4-5 (McGraw-Hill
2000).
261. TOM TAULLI, WHAT IS SHORT SELLING? 2 (2004).
262. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) traces its origins to 1792, when 24
New York City stockbrokers and merchants signed the Buttonwood Agreement. This
agreement set in motion the NYSE's unwavering commitment to investors and issuers.
Originally called the "curb market" because its brokers traded outdoors in the street, the
Amex has been at the forefront of the U.S. financial markets over the course of two
centuries. The historic combination of NYSE Group and Euronext in 2007 marked a
milestone for global financial markets. It brought together major marketplaces across
Europe and the United States whose histories stretch back more than four centuries.
The combination was by far the largest of its kind and the first to create a truly global
marketplace group, Today NYSE Euronext welcomes the historic American Stock
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implemented short-selling regulations for the first time in American
history because of the fear that the German Kaiser263 would short the
American markets triggering a financial disruption of the American
securities and financial markets.26 Short selling has had a catastrophic
impact on the securities and financial markets, and has led historically to
economic turmoil, such as the Great Depression 265 and the current
financial recession. In 1917, the NYSE was authorized to regulate short-
selling.266
Currently, short-selling is still perceived as a behavioral economics
matter that may need government regulation in order to be controlled.
Certain countries have gone even further and implemented corporal
punishment to deter short-selling. For example, in 1995, the Malaysian
Finance Ministry proposed that short-selling be punished by caning.267
Exchange into the world's largest and most liquid exchange group. NYSE Euronext,
History, http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1089312755484.html.
263. FRANK J. FABOZZI, SHORT SELLING: STRATEGIES, RISKS, AND REWARDS 183
(2004).
264. It is interesting that many political and corporate commentators believe that the
October 2008 American financial collapse was in part largely due to hedge funds
shorting the financial service companies.
265. Beginning in 1929 and lasting until about 1939, the Great Depression was an
economic slump that affected North America, Europe, and other industrialized areas of
the world. See Modem American Poetry, About the Great Depression,
http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/depression/about.htm.
The Great Depression was the longest and most severe depression ever experienced
by the industrialized Western world. Though the U.S. economy had gone into
depression six months earlier, the Great Depression may be said to have begun with a
catastrophic collapse of stock-market prices on the New York Stock Exchange in
October 1929. During the next three years stock prices in the United States continued
to fall, until by late 1932 they had dropped to only about 20 percent of their value in
1929. Besides ruining many thousands of individual investors, this precipitous decline
in the value of assets greatly strained banks and other financial institutions,
particularly those holding stocks in their portfolios. Many banks were consequently
forced into insolvency; by 1933, 11,000 of the United States' 25,000 banks had failed.
The failure of so many banks, combined with a general and nationwide loss of
confidence in the economy, led to much-reduced levels of spending and demand and
hence of production, thus aggravating the downward spiral. The result was drastically
falling output and drastically rising unemployment; by 1932, U.S. manufacturing
output had fallen to 54 percent of its 1929 level, and unemployment had risen to
between 12 and 15 million workers, or 25-30 percent of the work force.
Id.
266. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-12(a) (2006).
267. TAULLI, supra note 261, at 6.
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As late as 2001, approximately ten countries prohibited short-selling. 6
8
In fall 2008, due to the financial collapse in the markets, the SEC issued
a temporary ban on short sales of 799 financial stocks to stop traders
who sought to profit from the financial crisis by betting against bank
shares. The temporary emergency action was designed to protect the
integrity and quality of the securities market and strengthen investor
confidence. 2
69
The question then becomes why is short-selling viewed as such a
despised trading tactic? The answer, in part, is human nature-that is, it
is natural to dislike people that benefit at the misfortune of others, which
is precisely what short-sellers do-they make money when assets
decline in value or when companies do not perform well. 270 There is
something almost un-American with regard to short-selling. It seems
almost un-American to bet on the decrease of an asset or company's
value. Shorting is a phenomenon that has taken the securities industry by
storm. Hedge funds have made fortunes by utilizing this mechanism. 271
Certain commentators have observed that hedge funds that use the short-
selling trading technique frequently manipulate the market to obtain
their desired decrease in a targeted company's stock price by publishing
false negative research reports and simultaneously encouraging
reputable business reporters to publish investigative reports exposing a
targeted company's impending financial ruin. 72 What is often not
revealed is that investigative business news articles written by the
reputable business reporters are to a large extent, based on data supplied
to the reporters by hedge funds, primarily the negative research report.273
There is evidence to support an issue that has been raised fairly
often regarding hedge funds' attempts to manipulate the market. Some
268. Arturo Bris et al., Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and Markets Around the
World 31-32 (Yale ICF Working Paper No. 02-45, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-efficiency.pdf.
269. Vikas Bajaj & Graham Bowley, S.E.C. Temporarily Blocks Short Sales of
Financial Stocks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at B 1.
270. See FABOzzI, supra note 263, at 184; TAULLI, supra note 261, at 9.
271. The question should not be whether hedge funds should use this trading
technique. The question should be "how" do hedge funds manage to consistently
employ shorting techniques that statistically beat the average. How do they do it? How
do they know that the market will take a downturn with respect to one stock versus
another?
272. TAULLI, supra note 261, at 5.
273. Id.
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commentators argue that hedge funds, in particular, those that primarily
engage in short selling, frequently engage in market manipulation.274
Nonetheless some commentators argue that short-selling is beneficial to
the market because it eliminates market over-pricing. 275 They further
argue that federal regulation should not be amended to subject hedge
funds to the same rules against shorting to which mutual funds must
comply. 27 6 Traditionally, mutual funds are prohibited from utilizing
derivatives to avoid margin requirements established by the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation T, which requires a margin of 50% on short
sales and long positions in a stock. 277 Hedge funds do not have such
short selling constraints imposed upon their trading activity. As such,
they are able use short-selling combinations to make very sophisticated
long/short trade combinations based upon a hedge funds' prediction of
price movements in the markets.278
2. Massive Derivatives Losses and Liquidity Problems
In addition to the risks associated with derivatives trading, the
hedge fund industry has additional risks that are particular only to hedge
funds which include: (1) systemic risk, (2) contagion, (3) fund failure,
and (4) extreme leverage. Many commentators trading believe that
derivatives are extremely risky investments, 279 especially given the
274. See Sherry M. Shore, SEC Hedge Fund Regulatory Implications on Asian
Emerging Markets: Bottom Line or Bust, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 563, 577
(2005).
275. Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN.
1151, 1154 (1977).
276. Charles M. Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short Sale Constraints and Stock
Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 221 (2002); see also The Long and Short of Hedge
Funds: Effects of Strategies for Managing Market Risks: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Capital Markets, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Owen A. Lamont, Associate
Professor of Finance, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago) (stating that
270 companies that attacked short sellers had returns that lagged the market by 42%
over the following three years).
277. 12 C.F.R. § 220.18 (2009).
278. See WILLIAM J. CREREND, FUNDAMENTALS OF HEDGE FUND INVESTING 1
(1998).
279. Lydie Nadia Cabrera Pierre-Louis, Controlling a Financial Jurassic Park:
Obtaining Jurisdiction over Derivatives by Regulating Illegal Foreign Currency Boiler
Rooms, 8 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 35 (2007); Miguel A. Segoviano & Manmohan Singh,
Counterparty Risk in the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market (Int'l Monetary Fund,
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highly publicized massive derivative losses arising from situations such
as Orange County, California's bankruptcy 2 0 and Long-Term Capital
Management's federal bailout.281 Warren Buffet once referred to
derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction. 2 82  Ironically,
properly employed derivatives do not present any greater risk than any
other financial instruments.283 It really depends on the controls that
management implements to control the risk inherently associated with
derivatives. However, management of derivatives is more complex, and
mis-management has resulted in significant financial losses, which has
Working Paper No. 08/258, 2008), available at http://imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/
2008/wp08258.pdf; FDIC, Derivatives Risk in Commercial Banking, Mar. 26, 2003,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/032603fyi.html.
280. See Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Finance:
From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1295, 1348 (1995) (stating that Orange County's bankruptcy, which led to major
reduction in public services for California residents, was part of a larger trend of losses
experienced by the public sector from derivative investment); Henry T.C. Hu, Illiteracy
and Intervention: Wholesale Derivatives, Retail Mutual Funds, and the Matter of Asset
Class, 84 GEO. L.J. 2319, 2326 (1996) (describing the Orange County loss as one which
"dominate[d] the financial headlines").
281. See Symposium, Crisis in Confidence: Corporate Governance and
Professional Ethics Post-Enron, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1097, 1107 (2003) [hereinafter
Crisis in Confidence] (stating that a Federal Reserve bailout of $7 billion dollars for the
Long Term Capital Investment crisis of 1998 was motivated by a fear of a "crisis in
confidence" of the American economy); Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates
Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48
DUKE L.J. 701, 709 (1999) (opining that the "trading disaster" suffered by Long Term
Capital Management illustrates the risk of derivatives for individual investors, and the
economy as a whole).
282. BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, 2002 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 13-15 (2003),
available at http://berkshirehathaway.com/2002ar/2002ar.pdf.
283. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial Bingo": A Risk-
Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 IOWA. J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (noting that
speculators in these transactions embrace risk in order to profit from the fluctuations in
the price of the derivatives contract and provide liquidity to a market in which traders
are in direct competition); Joan E. McKown & Anita T. Purcell, Ninth Annual
Corporate Law Symposium: Securities Regulation: Article: Enforcement Actions
Involving Derivatives: BT Securities Corp. and Beyond, 65 U. CrN. L. REv. 117, 119
(1996) (asserting that though risky, "derivatives are not bad themselves. When used
properly, derivatives are valuable tools for managing financial risk. However, the
occasionally spectacular losses that are associated with derivatives and are reported by
the media apparently cause some managers to ask why their firms use derivatives and
lead some people to 'demonize' derivatives.").
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further resulted in the need for greater federal regulatory control. There
are primarily four types of risks associated with derivatives: (1) market
risk; (2) credit risk; (3) operational risk and (4) legal risk.284
Some commentators believe that hedge funds benefit the economy
by: (1) mitigating price downturns, (2) bearing risks that counter-parties
do not wish to bear, (3) making securities more liquid, (4) scouring
out/manipulating inefficiencies in the market. These "benefits" are
possible because hedge funds are not regulated,2 85 and can utilize
derivatives and leverage to impunity without disclosing their strategies
to the general public or regulators.
Institutional investors such as banks maintain written policies and
procedures that identify the risk tolerance of the board of directors,
which establishes the risk tolerance of the institutional entity engaging in
the derivatives transactions. The policies also delineate the lines of
authority and responsibility for managing the derivatives activities.286 In
contrast, hedge funds do not maintain any such policies and procedures.
Furthermore, the small investors that invest in hedge funds via pensions
funds are unaware and do not understand the derivatives transactions in
which hedge funds engage.28 7 Nor are small investors fully aware of all
policies and procedures that relate to their trading liability that can result
in massive and unexpected losses.288
284. See Joanne Medero, Managing Risk Derivatives-Recent Developments
Affecting Dealers and End-Users, in 1 27TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES
REGULATION 412 (PLI Corp. L. Course Handbook Series No. B-907, 1995); see
generally Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case for Derivatives Use:
Advocating a Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv.
595, 615-19 (summarizing the risks associated with derivatives).
285. Rene M. Stulz, Hedge Funds. Past, Present, and Future (Fischer Coll. of Bus.,
Working Paper No. 2007-03-003, 2007).
286. See David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 COLUM.
L. REv. 1312, 1374 (2001) (noting that because derivative dealers cannot always take
only well compensated risks, major investment banks usually have in place very strict
risk management policies for derivative transactions); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 215, 349-50 (2002) (noting
that the similarities in risk management policies leads to parallel investment strategies
by institutional investors, causing a potential dearth of liquidity if an adverse shock
struck the OTC derivatives market).
287. April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Hedge Fund Activism (NYU Working Paper No.
CLB-06-017, 2006).
288. Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements,
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3. Systemic Risk
The second type of trading risk particular to the hedge fund industry
that can lead to widespread failure, which may create the need for
federal governmental financial bailout, is systemic risk. Federal
regulators are concerned about the systemic risk that hedge funds pose-
that is, the risk to economic participants beyond hedge fund investors.289
Systemic risk is the risk that hedge fund losses can, and history has
shown will, spread to third parties, such as banks and broker-dealers, the
broader market, and the general public. Systemic risk is in essence a
market failure because the third-parties are unaware of their exposure to
hedge fund losses, and are unable to react to such losses, let alone
absorb such losses because the same trading activities that create
fabulous returns for hedge funds (short selling, derivatives trading, and
arbitrage) all create increased systemic risk for the broader financial
markets. 290
Perhaps the most infamous example of systemic risk is the collapse
of Long-Term Capital Management. 291 The implosion of Long-Term
Capital, its subsequent federal bailout, and continuing bankruptcy is a
lesson that regulators should do well to remember, particularly as
regulators discuss to what extent hedge funds should be regulated and
which transactions should remain unregulated. Hedge fund unregulated
status and access to federal bailout funds to cover their losses is an
Risk Management Guidelines for Derivatives, July 27, 1994, reprinted in Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,410, at 85,557 (Aug. 10, 1994); FUTURES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION
GLOBAL TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL INTEGRITY, FINANCIAL INTEGRITY
RECOMMENDATIONS: FOR FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS AND MARKET
PARTICIPANTS (1995).
289. Markus K. Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, Hedge Funds and the Technology
Bubble, 59 J. FIN. 2013, 2032 (2004).
290. Ben Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bank, Address at the Council on
Foreign Relations: Financial Reform to Address Systemic Risk (Mar. 10, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechbemanke
20090310a.htm).
291. Crisis in Confidence, supra note 281 (stating that a Federal Reserve bailout of
$7 billion dollars for the Long Term Capital Investment crisis of 1998 was motivated by
a fear of a "crisis in confidence" of the American economy); Lynn A. Stout, Why the
Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC
Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 791, 709 (1999) (opining that the "trading disaster" suffered
by Long Term Capital Management illustrates the risk of derivatives for individual
investors, and the economy as a whole).
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anomaly in American financial and securities markets.292 In 1998,
Long-Term Capital predicted that the spreads between the returns on
bonds of developing and industrialized countries would narrow. The
prediction was wrong. Long-Term Capital lost $4.4 billion in a matter
of weeks. The New York Federal Reserve provided a $7 billion federal
bailout, because it feared that a default by Long-Term Capital on its
existing derivative trading contracts would cause a domino default effect
throughout the U.S. and international securities markets. More than ten
years later, aspects of Long-Term Capital's bankruptcy are still in
litigation.293
In response to the Long-Term Capital debacle, several major
commercial and investment banks formed a policy group which issued
two reports detailing the improvements that the financial sector should
make to improve risk management. 294 After the collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, federal regulators conducted a review of the hedge
fund industry and concluded that if the hedge fund industry was unable
to absorb its trading losses, the federal government had adequate
resources to contain the financial risks that hedge fund trading strategies
would have on the markets. 295  The impact on the financial and
securities markets as result of hedge funds' inability to cover their
trading losses resulted in abrupt cessation of trading,296 completely
292. See Riva D. Atlas, Hedge Fund Rumors Rattle Markets, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2005, at C2 (stating that the secrecy of hedge funds as well as the collapse of Long
Term Capital Management have made a number of investors uneasy); Eric Altbach, The
Asian Crisis and the IMF: After the Deluge, The Debate, 17 JAPAN ECON. INST. REP.,
May 1, 1998, http://www.jei.org/Reports/JEIR/98JEIRsummaries/s9817.html (stating
that bailouts by the institutions such as the International Monetary Fund encourages
hedge fund irresponsibility and propagate financial crisis because lenders act fully
knowing that the IMF will absorb their losses).
293. Joseph G. Haubrich, Some Lessons on the Rescue of Long-Term Capital
Management (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Policy Discussion Paper No. 19,
2007).
294. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (1999), available
at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
WORKING GROUP] (examining the market crisis that the failure of Long Term Capital
Management precipitated).
295. Id.
296. See Vikas Agarwal et al., Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in
Hedge Fund Performance (London Business School, Working Paper No. 04-04, 2005);
Stuart Feffer & Christopher Kundro, Understanding and Mitigating Operational Risk in
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disrupting the broader markets, and resulted in catastrophic losses. For
example, 1998 Long-Term Capital Management's failure required a
consortium of investment banks to bail-out Long-Term Capital
Management to protect the integrity of the markets.29 v In September
2006, Amaranth Advisors suffered the largest collapse in hedge fund
industry, losing an estimated $6.6 billion in natural gas trades in a few
weeks. 298 Amaranth lost one-third more money in a few weeks than
Long-Term Capital lost over several months.2 99
4. Contagion
The third type of trading risk particular to the hedge fund industry
that can lead to widespread failure, which may create the need for
federal governmental financial bailout, is contagion.300 We move,
therefore, beyond the Long-Term Capital model of a single fund
imploding, to the systemic failure of several funds collapsing at the same
time, and the resulting domino default effect that will undoubtedly send
shockwaves throughout the world's economy. 301 The likelihood of
contagion occurring is not as far fetched as we think. For example, it
may begin as simple as one hedge fund experiencing liquidity risk, and
therefore selling its investments at a major loss because of its need for
cash. The hedge fund's losses spread to the lender that loaned the hedge
fund money to make the investments that it surreptitiously dumped, (the
lender is now unable to recover the money lent to the defaulting hedge
Hedge Fund Investments (Capco White Paper, 2003).
297. See LOWENSTEIN, supra note 81 (relating story of growth and collapse of long
term capital markets). See also Crisis in Confidence, supra note 281, at 1107 (stating
that a Federal Reserve bailout of $7 billion dollars for the Long Term Capital
Investment crisis of 1998 was motivated by a fear of a "crisis in confidence" of the
financial economy).
298. Steven Mufson, Hedge Fund's Collapse Met with a Shrug: Amaranth's Loss in
Natural Gas Gamble Not Seen as Affecting Broader Market, WASH. POST, Sept. 20
2006, at DOI; Ludwig B. Chincarini, Natural Gas Futures and Spread Position Risk:
Lessons from the Collapse of Amaranth Advisors L.L.C. (Working Paper Series, 2008);
see SCOTT FRUSH, HEDGE FUNDS DEMYSTIFIED (2008).
299. See Shadab, supra note 74, at 36.
300. See generally Nicole Boyson et al., supra note 93 (finding "find strong
evidence of contagion across hedge fund styles, so that hedge fund styles tend to have
poor coincident returns").
301. See ROBERT F. BRUNER & SEAN D. CARR, THE PANIC OF 1907: LESSONS
LEARNED FROM THE MARKET'S PERFECT STORM (2009).
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fund), and to the counter-parties on the other side of the trading contract
(who may not be able to absorb the unexpected losses of the defaulting
hedge fund).3 °2
Continuing with our hypothetical, let's take the hypothetical a little
further. Imagine if you will that numerous hedge funds made the same
investment-a common hedge fund strategy known as herding.30 3 Let's
further presume that the hedge funds' investment went bad (a likely
occurrence), and they are all forced to sell their positions at a major loss
(the ever present liquidity risk). As in our previous example, the hedge
funds' losses are spread to the lenders that loaned the hedge funds
money to make the investments that they surreptitiously dumped, (the
lenders are now unable to recover the monies lent to the defaulting
hedge funds), and to the counter-parties on the other side of the trading
contracts (who may not be able to absorb the unexpected losses of the
defaulting hedge funds). This multiplier effect would have a devastating
effect on the U.S. and world economies.
5. Excessively or Highly-Leveraged Transactions
The fourth type of risk particular to the hedge fund industry is their
continuous engagement in excessively or highly leveraged transactions.
Leverage can be simply defined as the ability to lose or make more than
the initial invested amount because of the ability to borrow against the
invested amount or use derivatives to make additional investments.30 4
302. At the time that the author developed this hypothetical in March 2007, it was
18 months prior to Lehman Brother's collapse and the current financial crisis.
303. See Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy & Natural Resources, 110th
Cong. 15 (2008) (written testimony of Jeffrey Harris, Chief Economist, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission) (defining herding as the propensity of various market
participants to be trading on the same side of the market concurrently). Although many
rules govern the behavior of individual traders, the CFTC recognizes that concurrent
trading by groups of traders-'herds"--can detrimentally affect markets. Herding
behavior can represent an impediment to the efficient functioning of markets if market
participants follow the herd blindly, causing prices to over-adjust to new information.
Herding typically occurs only when prices were falling and price increases were
unrelated to herding activity. See id.
304. See InvestorWords.com, Leverage, http://www.investorwords.com/2786/
leverage.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). Leverage is defined as:
The degree to which an investor or business is utilizing borrowed money. Companies
that are highly leveraged may be at risk of bankruptcy if they are unable to make
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Excessive leverage or highly leveraged can be defined as significant
borrowing or utilization of derivatives to finance investments, which
magnify losses to such a multiple that the borrower is unable to pay the
losses and is likely to file for bankruptcy.30 5
There are no limits to a hedge fund's ability to use leverage,
30 6
except for those limits imposed by a hedge fund's lender and counter-
party. 307 Banks, in particular, are subject to risk-capital regulations that
provide the minimum capital requirements based upon the risk prototype
of the underlying asset, which includes loans to and trades with hedge
funds.30" The majority of hedge funds borrow heavily3 9 because the
borrowed funds provide the much needed capital to execute the complex
and extremely risky trades. The investment strategies in which hedge
funds engage require a great deal of capital. For example, hedge funds
that engage in arbitrage trades need much more capital than those that
engage in shareholder activism. Most hedge funds are leveraged 2 to 1
payments on their debt; they may also be unable to find new lenders in the future.
Leverage is not always bad, however; it can increase the shareholders' return on their
investment and often there are tax advantages associated with borrowing.
Id.
305. See InvestorWords.com, Highly Leveraged Transaction, http://www.investor
words.com/715 1/highlyleveraged _transaction.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009)
(defining a highly leveraged transaction as a loan made to a financial institution that
already has a large amount of debt). "The large amount of pre-existing debt means that
the company is already leveraged, so additional debt can increase the risk of bankruptcy
if the company is unable to make interest payments." Id. See Willa E. Gibson, Is Hedge
Fund Regulation Necessary?, 73 TEMP. L. REv. 681 (2000) (discussing how hedge
funds' excessive use of leverage can result in huge profits or huge losses, which will
spill over into the financial market and the securities market as well); Shawn Tully, End
of Wall Street as We Know It: Financial Firms Have Relied on a Highly Flawed
Business Model for Years, FORTUNE, Mar. 17, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/17/
magazines/fortune/investing/TullyWallStIsBrokenfortune/index.htm.
306. See PRESIDENT'SWORKING GROUP, supra note 294.
307. See id. at 5. Hedge funds carte blanche towards leverage is restrained only by
the willingness and ability of lenders and counterparties extend credit and funds to
hedge funds. Broker-dealers that lend to hedge funds must comply with the margin
requirements of Federal Reserve System, Regulation T. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1 to 220.12
(2009). Additionally, FINRRA imposes additional maintenance margins. FINRA Rule
2520(c)-(d); NYSE Rule 43 1(c)-(d). Furthermore banks that lend to hedge funds must
comply with treasury risk-capital regulations. 12 C.F.R. § 32.3(a) (2009). See id.
308. See FDIC, Basel I and the Evolution of Capital Regulation: Moving Forward,
Looking Back, Jan. 14, 2003, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2003/011403fyi.
309. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 294, at 5.
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to their investment capital, and some are leveraged as much as 30 to 1 to
their investment capital. 310
As discussed earlier, hedge fund losses are spread to the lender that
loaned the hedge fund money to make the investments (the lender is now
unable to recover the money lent to the defaulting hedge fund), and to
the counter-parties on the other side of the trading contract (who may
not be able to absorb the unexpected losses of the defaulting hedge
fund). Now let's take it one step further. Imagine that numerous hedge
funds are over-leveraged-a common hedge fund occurrence. As in our
previous example, these significant hedge fund losses are spread to the
lenders, and to the counter-parties who may not be able to absorb the
unexpected losses of the defaulting hedge funds. Again, this multiplier
effect would have a devastating effect on the U.S. and world
economies."' Regulators and hedge fund industry groups recognize that
hedge fund risk management has significant challenges, primarily with
operational risk as a result of derivatives trading.31 2 Hedge funds
borrow heavily, and when their trading strategies fail, the huge losses
are passed on to investors, lenders and trading counter-parties. 1 3
Secretary of the Treasury Timothy Geithner, when he was President and
CEO of the New York Federal Reserve, shared certain observations on
hedge fund leverage and associated risk to the financial markets
indicates several developments since the collapse of Long-Term Capital
Management ten years ago: (1) the sheer number of hedge funds has
increased drastically, (2) lender and counter-party exposure is more
diversified, (3) lenders and counter-parties have dramatically increased
their risk management, and (4) banks' capital relative to risk has
remained constant.314 From the comments it sounds as the markets have
310. See id.
311. Robert C. Pozen, Hedge Funds Today. To Regulate or Not?, WALL ST. J., June
20, 2005, at A14 (noting that collapse of highly leveraged funds will threaten the
integrity of financial industry).
312. See Karmel, supra note 78, at 70 (arguing that in the absence of a new crisis
involving derivatives, excessive leverage in the market or manipulative activities by
institutional investors, it is unlikely that Congress, the SEC or any other financial
regulator will decide to study and reform institutional investors' behavior).
313. See id.
314. Timothy F. Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Keynote
Address: Hedge Funds and Their Implications for the Financial System (Nov. 17, 2004)
(transcript available at http://www.ny.frb.org/newsevents/speeches/2004/gei0411
17.html).
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adapted and can easily absorb any unforeseen crisis. However, Mr.
Geithner continued his comments by noting that further improvements
in risk management by counter-parties and lenders are needed including
better due diligence and demanding that hedge fund disclose the nature
of their operations.
V. HEDGE FUNDS CREATE A ZONE OF MANIPULATIVE SCHEMES
A 11 the capital employed in paper speculation is barren and useless.
•.. It nourishes in our citizens habits of vice and idleness instead of
industry and morality ....
-Thomas Jefferson3"5
A. Hedge Funds Engaging in Late Trading and Market Timing
In 2003, based primarily upon the information Noreen Harrington
provided, the New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer reached a $40
million settlement with Canary Capital Partners, LLC and Canary
Investment Management, LLC (collectively, "Canary Capital") and Mr.
Edward J. Stem, Managing Principal for violations of New York's
General Business Law and Executive Law involving arrangements to
engage in market timing and late trading strategies.31 6 Subsequently, the
New York Attorney General and the Massachusetts Secretary of the
Commonwealth each launched investigations into market timing and late
trading of shares of registered investment companies ("mutual funds").
The SEC and the U.S. Justice Department317 subsequently announced
315. THE JEFFERSONIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 932 (John P. Foley ed., Funk & Wagnalls
Co. 1900).
316. Canary Complaint, supra note 154.
317. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789), created the
Office of the Attorney General. Originally a one-person part-time position, the Attorney
General was to be "learned in the law" with the duty "to prosecute and conduct all suits
in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United
States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touching any matters
that may concern their departments." The workload quickly became too much for one
person, necessitating the hiring of several assistants for the Attorney General. With an
increasing amount of work to be done, private attorneys were retained to work on cases.
In 1870, after the post-Civil War increase in the amount of litigation involving the
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similar investigations conducted in conjunction with the investigations
already underway in New York and Massachusetts.1 8 The New York
Attorney General's Office investigated "arrangements ' 3 1 9 between
mutual funds and certain hedge funds including Canary Capital that
permitted the hedge funds to engage in market timing and/or late
trading. The "arrangements" are not per se illegal activities. However,
"arrangements" entered into by mutual funds with certain hedge fund
investors that were allowed to market time the purchases of mutual fund
shares and redemptions of mutual fund shares for maximum profit for
the hedge funds.
These "arrangements" contradicted stated mutual fund policies and
were not disclosed to all mutual fund investors. These "arrangements"
irrevocably harmed existing mutual fund investors by siphoning profits
from the other mutual fund investors. The "arrangements" were the
bases of breach of fiduciary duty claims against the mutual funds'
investment advisers and board of directors because of the funds'
inconsistent application of fund policies regarding restrictions or
prohibitions against market timing and/or late trading. The mutual
funds' prospectuses stated that the funds' attempted to restrict or
United States necessitated the very expensive retention of a large number of private
attorneys to handle the workload, a concerned Congress passed the Act to Establish the
Department of Justice, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870), setting it up as "an executive
department of the government of the United States" with the Attorney General as its
head. Officially coming into existence on July 1, 1870, the Department of Justice,
pursuant to the 1870 Act, was to handle the legal business of the United States. The Act
gave the Department control over all criminal prosecutions and civil suits in which the
United States had an interest. In addition, the Act gave the Attorney General and the
Department control over federal law enforcement. To assist the Attorney General, the
1870 Act created the Office of the Solicitor General. The 1870 Act is the foundation
upon which the Department of Justice still rests. However, the structure of the
Department of Justice has changed over the years, with the addition of the Deputy
Attorneys General and the formation of the Divisions. Unchanged is the steadily
increasing workload of the Department. It has become the world's largest law office
and the central agency for enforcement of federal laws.
318. Recent Commission Activity to Combat Misconduct Relating to Mutual Funds:
Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Fin. Mgmt., the Budget, & Int'l Sec., Comm. on
Gov't Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) (written testimony of Stephen M. Cutler, Director,
Division of Enforcement, SEC).
319. "Arrangements" were contracts between hedge funds and investment advisers
to allow hedge funds to have the capacity-permission to time the purchase and
redemption of particular mutual funds for the maximum profit to the hedge funds. See
Canary Complaint, supra note 154, at 4, 13.
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discourage market timing and late trading activities (including through
the imposition of short-term trading penalties, delayed exchanges or
involuntary redemptions). However, that was far from the truth.
The complaint provided, in relevant part, that Canary Capital
engaged in late trading on a daily basis from March 2000 until the New
York Attorney General's Office began its investigation in July of 2003.
During the declining market of 2001 and 2002, Canary Capital used late
trading to, in effect, sell mutual fund shares short. This caused the
mutual funds to overpay for their shares as the market went down,
serving to magnify long-term mutual fund investors' losses. The
investigation targeted dozens of mutual funds but only one hedge fund.
The complaint further alleged that Canary Capital obtained some of its
late trading "capacity" directly from one mutual fund manager, Bank of
American N.A. Bank of America installed special computer equipment
in Canary's office that allowed it to buy and sell Bank of America's
mutual fund companies, the Nations Funds, and hundreds of other
mutual funds at the 4:00 P.M. price until as late as 6:30 P.M. EST. In
return, Canary Capital agreed to leave millions of dollars in Bank of
America bond funds on a long-term basis as "sticky assets., 320 Based, in
part on these allegations, Bank of America entered into a settlement
agreement with the New York State Office of the Attorney General for
approximately $675 million. Additionally, the settlement included
corrective measures designed to set a new standard for accountability by
the directors of mutual fund companies.
321
At the center of the Bank of America story is the Nations Funds'
board of directors' failure to disclose the "arrangements" that it had
entered into with Canary Capital to the detriment of thousands of
Nations Funds' investors. Under a specific provision of the settlement
agreement, eight members of the board of directors of Nations Funds,
resigned or otherwise left the board in the course of one year for their
role in approving a controversial, if not per se illegal measure that
enabled a hedge fund to conduct company-sanctioned market timing and
late trading of Bank of America and other mutual funds by Canary
Capital. 322 The Nations Funds' board directors breach of its fiduciary
320. These parked funds are known in the hedge fund industry as "sticky assets."
Canary Complaint, supra note 154, at 15.
321. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Governance of Banks,
9 ECON. POLICY REv. 91 (2003).
322. Amy Borrus, A Guide to the Hedge Fund Maze: Dizzying Growth and an
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duties by failing to protect the interest, and entering into "arrangement"
that created a conflict of interest with the mutual fund investors. The
directors allowed Canary Capital, a favored hedge fund client, to engage
in late trading and market timing practices that personally harmed
thousands of mutual fund investors. Bank of America never disclosed its
"arrangement" with Canary Capital in its filings with the SEC. Failure
to disclose such controversial, if not per se illegal activity which falls
within the materiality requirement of the Securities Exchange Act and
the rules promulgated thereunder evidences a need for further
modification and clarification of the disclosure duties of publicly-traded
323companies.
B. Hedge Funds Distributing Negative Research Reports to the Public
Publication of questionable "research reports" is but one trading
strategy that hedge funds employ. Hedge funds use a variety of
investment strategies that are perceived as complex because they involve
numerous combinations of trades in order to increase the probability of
the hedge fund making a profitable return. Many types of investment
strategies exist, including shorting, merger arbitrage,324 distressed
Absence of Regulation Have Spawned a Series of Scandals, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Oct.
19, 2005, http://www.buisnessweek.com/bwdailydnflash/oct2005/nf2O051019_1613
db016htm (stating hedge funds opposed to increased regulation use their money to
influence legislators).
323. See S.J. Grossman & O.D. Hart, Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J. FIN.
323, 323-34 (1980).
324. See Investopedia.com, Merger Arbitrage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/
m/mergerarbitrage.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). Merger arbitrage is defined as
follows.
A hedge fund strategy in which the stocks of two merging companies are
simultaneously bought and sold to create a riskless profit. A merger arbitrageur looks
at the risk that the merger deal will not close on time, or at all. Because of this slight
uncertainty, the target company's stock will typically sell at a discount to the price
that the combined company will have when the merger is closed. A regular portfolio
manager may focus only on the profitability of the merged entity. In contrast, merger
arbitrageurs care only about the probability of the deal being approved and how long
it will take the deal to close.
Id.; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 4. See also IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL
STABILITY REPORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES 45 (2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2004/02/index.htm [hereinafter IMF REPORT]
(listing and defining various hedge fund strategies including shorting, merger arbitrage,
distresses securities, convertible arbitrage, derivatives, fixed income, risk arbitrage,
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securities, 325 convertible arbitrage, 326 and derivatives trading3 27 to name
a few. Perhaps of the almost exhaustive list of strategic trades that hedge
funds use, the most infamous are derivatives trading. Regulators have
been concerned about the derivative trading strategies that hedge funds
emerging markets, equity hedge, global macro, and sector composite).
325. See Investopedia.com, Distressed Securities, http://www.investopedia.com/
terms/d/distressedsecurities.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2009). Distressed securities are
defined as follows.
A financial instrument in a company that is near or is currently going through
bankruptcy. This usually results from a company's inability to meet its financial
obligations. As a result, these financial instruments have suffered a substantial
reduction in value. Distressed securities can include common and preferred shares,
bank debt, trade claims (goods owed) and corporate bonds.
Id.; SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 35; see also IMF REPORT, supra note 324, at
52 (defining various hedge fund strategies including shorting, merger arbitrage,
distresses securities, convertible arbitrage, derivatives, fixed income, risk arbitrage,
emerging markets, equity hedge, global macro, and sector composite).
326. See SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 81, at 35; Investopedia.com, Convertible
Arbitrage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/convertiblearbitrage.asp (last visited
Oct. 12, 2009) (defining convertible arbitrage as an "investing strategy that involves the
long position on a convertible security and a short position in its converting common
stock"); see also IMF REPORT, supra note 324, at 52 (defining various hedge fund
strategies including shorting, merger arbitrage, distresses securities, convertible
arbitrage, derivatives, fixed income, risk arbitrage, emerging markets, equity hedge,
global macro, and sector composite).
327. The author was unable to find a definition of the "derivative trading" in any
financial, economic, or legal literature. Perhaps it is this opaqueness in the derivatives
industry that compelled Senator Tom Harkin (D-IA) to sponsor the Derivatives Trading
Integrity Act of 2009. Senator Harkin stated that he "believes that Derivatives Trading
Integrity Act will bring more transparency and accountability into the marketplace."
Press Release, Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committee, Harkin Measure
Would Require Openness, Transparency, and Integrity in Swaps and All Futures
Trading (Nov. 20, 2008), available at http://216.40.253.202/-usscanf/index.php?
option=com content&task=view&id = 1 812&Itemid = 2. Specifically, the bill amends the
Commodity Exchange Act to eliminate the distinction between "excluded" and
"exempt" commodities and regulated, exchange-traded commodities; futures contracts
for all commodities would be treated the same. A summary of the bill by Government
Track provides, in relevant part, that the bill amends the Commodity Exchange Act to:
"(1) repeal the exemption or exclusion from regulation by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) of specified derivative transactions, swap transactions,
and related electronic trading facilities; (2) restrict futures trading to contract markets or
derivatives transaction execution facilities; and (3) abolish exempt boards of trade." See
Govtrack.us, Overview of the Derivatives Trading Integrity Act of 2009,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s 11-272&tab=summary (last visited
Oct. 12, 2009).
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employ because of their potential impact on the financial and securities
markets and, in particularly on small investors.3 28 Nonetheless, a
relatively new trading strategy that hedge funds employ commonly
referred to as "funds of funds"312 9 has added an additional layer of
concern for regulators because certain funds of funds are marketed to the
general public. 330
For short selling to work best in terms of the aggregate return that a
hedge fund receives by speculating against a targeted company
performing well, at times a hedge fund may engage in a manipulative
measures to "create" a scenario where the marketplace perceives a
targeted company as not performing well. A most effective means that
hedge funds use to create a negative perception of a targeted company is
the widespread publication of negative research reports about a targeted
company to the general public.' Such hedge funds may spread false
negative rumors on blogs and various investor chat rooms as well as
release "research reports" about the company that they have shorted in
order to create a wide-spread sell-off of the stock by investors which in
turn drives the stock price down. As such, the hedge funds profit by
purchasing the stock of the company from panicked investors who are
desperate to sell the "sinking' stock. The hedge funds purchase the
stock at abnormally low price locking in their predetermined profit.
332
The anti-fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act Section l0b and
328. Michael M. Grynbaum, As Losses Mount, the Fed and the White House Step
Up Derivatives Trading Is Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2008, at C 1.
329. SEC, Hedge, http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (defining a fund of hedge
funds as an investment company that invests in hedge funds rather than investing in
individual securities. Some funds of hedge funds register their securities with the SEC.
These funds of hedge funds must provide investors with a prospectus and must file
certain reports quarterly with the SEC).
330. Dave Kansas, Making Sense of Wall Street: As Investment Choices Pile Up,
Grasping Fundamentals Is Key, Hedge Fund Boom Explained, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14,
2006, at B 1 (describing a fund of funds as pools of money gathered from individuals
and institutions, which in turn are funneled into a group of hedge funds. This practice
has opened the world of hedge funds to new, smaller class of investors).
331. New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's Office received copies of
several negative research reports published by hedge funds which targeted public
companies including Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac), MBIA,
Inc, and Pre-paid Legal, Inc.
332. See DANIEL REINGOLD, CONFESSIONS OF A WALL STREET ANALYST: A TRUE
STORY OF INSIDE INFORMATION AND CORRUPTION IN THE STOCK MARKET (2006)
(describing the manipulative and illegal use of inside information in Wall Street).
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RulelOb-5 333 does not apply because the negative reports are not issued
in connection with the purchase and sale of a security. The negative
research reports are not published simultaneously with the purchase or
sale of security, rather the hedge funds purchase securities weeks and
months before the negative research reports are published, accumulating
massive short positions, totaling millions of dollars. 3
To further ensure that the marketplace perceives a targeted
company in a negative light, prior to the release of the negative research
reports, the hedge would have slowly accumulated over several months
a sizable amount of credit default swaps. The purchase of the credit
default swaps are designed to give the appearance in the marketplace
that there is concern regarding the targeted company's financial ability
to repay its debts and other financial obligations.
C. Hedge Funds Purchasing Credit Default Swaps
The credit-default swaps market is $39 trillion market and has
operated in the shadows. There is no public disclosure or any legal
requirement governing these contracts.335 Since there is no necessity to
report these transactions to the SEC, federal regulators did not have a
way to assess the amount of risk in the financial system, whether credit-
default swaps have been accurately valued or honestly traded, and
whether financial institutions issuing and trading credit default swaps
333. 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2009), provides in relevant part that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Id.
334. Moorad Choudhry, The Credit Default Swap Basis; How Credit Default Swaps
Became a Timebomb, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 2008, at 83.
335. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 294, at 25 (discussing no
systemic risk from such derivatives since "private counterparty discipline"--investors'
natural desire to keep their own risks to a minimum-would work to protect the broader
financial system).
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have taken on too much risk that threatens unsuspecting investors.336
Hedge funds purchase credit default swaps, which are insurance
contracts that cover losses on the insured transaction in the event of a
default. Credit default swaps were typically purchased to insure
municipal bond, corporate debt and mortgage securities transactions.33 7
Beginning in the late 1990s, hedge funds began to purchase credit
default swaps in targeted companies that shorted to give the markets the
misconception that company was experiencing major credit problems.
The result was a decrease in the stock price of the targeted company due
to the investing public's misdirected uncomfort regarding the targeted
company's ability to perform and succeed in the market. Furthermore,
hedge funds that engage in this type of manipulative practice will
oftentimes encourage renowned business journalists to write an
investigative expose of the company's eminent financial demise further
feeding the sell-off fervor.338
Hedge funds often use credit derivatives such as credit default
swaps to manage the risks to which they are exposed through their
equity investments by buying credit protection through a credit default
swap. The current financial meltdown has revealed the extent to which
regulated financial institutions are intertwined with unregulated hedge
funds, in particular hedge funds' purchase of credit default swaps from
regulated insurance companies to ensure hedge funds' speculative
investment. The ability of hedge funds to shift their risk to regulated
financial institutions if extremely problematic. If the insurance company
does not have sufficient collateral to bear the losses that the hedge fund
has insured, the insurance company will collapse unless it is able to
reinsure the credit default swap or receive a substantial infusion of
capital to cover the losses. This is precisely the unfortunate scenario
which happened with American International Group.3 3 9
336. Christopher Cox, Swapping Secrecy for Transparency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18,
2008, at § WK, at 12.
337. Janet Morrissey, Credit Default Swaps: The Next Crisis?, TIME, Mar. 17,
2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1723152,00.html.
338. Interview with Roger Waldman, Senior Enforcement Counsel, Office of the
New York State Attorney General, Investment Protection Bureau (Jan. 28, 2008)
(discussing investigative news articles that appeared in the Wall Street Journal, New
York Times, and other financial news pertaining to Farmer Mac, MBIA, Inc., and Pre-
paid Legal, Inc.).
339. American International Group, Inc., About AIG, http://www.aigcorporate.com/
aboutaig/index.html. AIG can trace its roots back nearly 100 years when it began as a
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American International Group (AIG) issued $440 billion in credit-
default swaps. As the real estate market took a precipitous decline AIG
experienced downgrades in its credit ratings. As a result, holders of the
credit-default swaps wanted more collateral, which AIG could not
provide. Credit default swaps originally issued by AIG were widely
resold in the secondary market. AIG was trapped in an intricate web of
transactions. These transactions created a systemic risk that contributed
to a gravitational pull that threatened to pull AIG down under the weight
of its own financial obligation and would create a financial domino
effect in AIG's global insurance business. As such, the U.S. government
provided AIG with an $85 million rescue package. Based on the impact
that credit default swaps have on world markets, there is a structural
evolution currently underway to provide greater transparency and lower
counter-party risk through the utilization of central counter-parties and
other practices.340 Congress has proposed legislation to regulate the
credit default swap transactions.
3 41
VI. RECOMMENDATION
Markets can remain irrational far longer than
you or I can remain solvent.
-John Maynard Keynes
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The author proposes a hybrid hedge fund governance matrix be
developed with a three prong regulatory structure to provide required
varying levels of disclosure and transparency based on the volume,
small insurance company. See id. Since that time it has grown to become one of the
world's largest companies. See id. By the end of 2007 "AIG had assets of
approximately $1 trillion, $110 billion in annual revenues, 74 million customers, and
116,000 employees in 130 countries and jurisdictions. Yet, less than a year later, AIG
found itself on the brink of failure and in need of emergency government assistance."
Id.
340. Shannon D. Harrington, Credit Swaps To Be Overhauled as Dealers Curb
Risks (Update 2), BLOOMBERG, Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=20601087&sid=aa 1Y8DpE6p 1I&refer=home.
341. Regulation of credit default swap market would be included in the
comprehensive Over-The-Counter (OTC) Derivatives Market Act of 2009. See H.R.
977, 111 th Cong. (2009).
342. John Maynard Keynes, Economist and Investor, http://www.maynard
keynes.org.
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frequency and potential losses in which particular hedge funds may
engage or experience. The hybrid hedge fund governance matrix is
designed to project the potential negative impact that certain hedge fund
activity may have on the financial and securities markets. Recently
James Thomson, a Vice President and Financial Economist at the
Cleveland Federal Reserve Bank, presented an amusing and simple
drawing board presentation on YouTube, to outline a three-tiered
regulatory system to determine appropriate regulator response to
systemically important financial institutions.
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The first prong is a simple one: all hedge funds must register with
the SEC and the liability for such failure to register is the automatic
submission to SEC jurisdiction. This requirement is analogous to the
CFTC requirement that any person who engages in commodities trading
transactions on behalf of another must be registered with the CFTC.
344
Required registration with the SEC is not a novel concept. Recently, the
SEC attempted to require the largest hedge funds to register with the
SEC. As we have discussed in Section V, the Goldstein decision
vacated the SEC's authority to require hedge funds to register based
upon the SEC's arbitrary and capricious definition of the term "client."
The Goldstein decision does not prohibit the SEC from regulating hedge
funds. It simply prohibits the SEC from arbitrarily re-defining existing
terms and removing existing definitional safe harbors that certain
persons have relied on to be exempted from SEC jurisdiction. However,
it is time that the SEC imposed a new definition. A definition that is as
simple and expansive as the CFTC definition as to whom must register
with, and be subject to, CFTC jurisdiction. The SEC may require that
any person who is not already subject to other federal regulation and
343. James Thomson, What To Do About Systemically Important Financial
Institutions (Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland Policy Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009),
available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/topics/finstability/three-tier-risk/.
344. Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(d) (2006). The Commodities
Exchange Act provides in relevant part, that:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to engage as futures commission merchant or
introducing broker in soliciting orders or accepting orders for the purchase or sale of
any commodity for future delivery, or involving any contracts of sale of any
commodity for future delivery, on or subject to the rules of any contract market or
derivatives transaction execution facility unless-
(1) such person shall have registered, under this chapter, with the Commission as
such futures commission merchant or introducing broker and such registration shall
not have expired nor been suspended nor revoked.
92 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LA W
engaged in "hedging activity" 341 on behalf of another must be registered
with the SEC. Such a broad definition would bring within SEC
jurisdiction hedge fund activity that poses the greatest threat to the
stability of the financial and securities markets.
The second prong requires registered hedge funds to disclose to the
SEC investment strategies, holdings, and potential risks associated with
certain hedge fund activity. This requirement is analogous to the mutual
fund disclosure requirement that compels mutual funds to reveal their 10
largest portfolio holdings on a 30-day delayed cycle.
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The third prong also requires publicly-traded companies to disclose
their exposure to hedge funds3 47 and other significantly leveraged
348
entities. The purpose of the rule would be to bring hedge funds that
traditionally transact with publicly-traded companies within the zone of
disclosure required under the Securities Exchange Act that all material
information is provided to investors and the general public. Currently,
publicly-traded companies disclose on a limited basis their exposure to
hedge funds primarily through the purchase of credit default swaps 349 to
protect themselves from counter-party risks. However, publicly-traded
companies do not provide detailed disclosure of their risk exposure to
hedge fund counter-party trades, financing and investing as part of their
periodic reporting duties under the Securities Exchange Act. These types
of private, inadequately disclosed transactions by publicly traded
345. "Hedging activity" is a term that should be defined by the SEC to include all of
the known forms of transactions in which hedge fund engage including short selling,
excessive borrowing, derivatives trading and publication of negative research reports to
the general public. The list of activity cannot by definition be a finite one given the
innovative nature of the hedge fund industry.
346. Disclosure of each mutual fund's complete holdings is required to be made
quarterly within 60 days of the end of each fiscal quarter (currently, each January 31,
April 30, July 31, and October 31) in the Annual Report and Semi-Annual Report to
Fund shareholders and in the quarterly holdings report on Form N-Q.
347. See PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP, supra note 294, at 33.
348. This disclosure requirement would satisfy the concerns raised by Federal
Reserve Chairman Bernanke regarding the risk management of broker-dealers that
provide prime brokering services to hedge funds such as financing, trade execution,
clearing and settlement services to hedge funds. See Bernanke, supra note 235.
349. Christos Ioannidis & Giovanni Calice, An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of
the Credit Default Swap Index Market on Large Complex Financial Institutions
(Working Paper Series, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1447403. However,
a detailed analysis of the impact of credit default swaps on the U.S. markets has yet to
be written.
2009 HEDGE FUND FRAUD 93
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
companies are at a minimum disturbing to our sense of fair and adequate
disclosure.
The inadequacy of the federal regulation to protect the investing
public has, in part, led to the current historical disruption of the financial
and securities markets. Our federal financial disclosure policy350 is
designed to provide investors with all material information to allow
investors to make a reasonable investment choice. The federal
disclosure rules should be amended to require publicly-traded companies
to provide a detailed description of the company's hedge fund trading
activity, risk exposure, potential impact on the company's operations,
and the identity of the hedge fund itself. The information can be
provided in the Management Discussion and Analysis with
corresponding schedules and footnotes. The disclosure should be
comprehensive and analogous to disclosure requirements that are
currently required for off-balance sheet transactions with which
publicly-traded companies must provide pursuant to the Enron debacle.
The fourth prong is for the SEC to share the hedge fund activity
disclosure information that it receives from hedge funds and publicly-
traded companies with state securities regulators. The SEC may
coordinate monitoring and enforcement efforts with the North American
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA).35" ' NASAA members
which include every state securities regulatory agency in the country,
such as the New York State Attorney General's Office, the
Massachusetts Securities Division, and the Colorado Division of
Securities can be bring a great deal of expertise, resources and existing
cooperative regulatory structure to the monitoring and enforcement
efforts concerning questionable hedge fund activity.
350. See 17 C.F.R. § 2001.1 (2009).
351. North American Securities Administrators Association, About NASAA,
http://www.nasaa.org/About NASAA/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2009) (describing NASAA
as "the oldest international organization devoted to investor protection").
94 FORDHAMJOURNAL Vol. XV
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW
VII. CONCLUSION
Out of every crisis, every tribulation, every disaster,
mankind rises with some share of greater knowledge,
of higher decency, ofpurer purpose ....
-Franklin Delano Roosevelt 31
Some commentators argue that American markets must remain
competitive in a global financial economy. But Congress must ask, "at
what cost?" How long should certain activities and participants in the
financial and securities markets remain unregulated in order for the
American markets to be competitive? The answer cannot be that
Congress will continue to allow private unregulated groups of investors
to access financial and securities markets, conduct complex trades,
borrow excessively from major banks, and yet refuse to disclose who
they are, and what potential negative impact their transactions may have
on the financial and securities markets and, more importantly, on the
American investing public.
The current financial collapse and economic struggle has proven
that Congress cannot and should not deter from adopting legislation that
can constrain the extravagance of certain hedge fund activity while
simultaneously creating a regulatory balance that will not stifle
innovation of new and creative financial products. The sustainability of
the financial and securities markets, free of fraudulent or excessive
hedge fund activity is imperative. The current absence of case law on
this issue evidences that these are novel issues for the courts, Congress
and the investing public. As such, it is uncertain whether a bright-line
regulatory rule should be established. The challenge for Congress will
be to amend, where necessary, the Securities Act, the Securities
Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act, or the Adviser Act and the
rules promulgated thereunder to provide define and to clarify "hedge
fund activity" and "hedge funds," while simultaneously allowing such
definitions to evolve with time, as new and innovative financial
instruments are created in the hedge fund industry.
As for Noreen Harrington, the brave whistleblower who came
forward to tell an amazing story of how hedge funds were defrauding
American mutual fund investors-ninety-five million American
352. Roosevelt Address, supra note 1.
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investors owe Ms. Harrington a debt of gratitude. However, as a result
of her disclosure she lost her job and became subject of much media
coverage. Nevertheless, because of her courage hundreds of investors
impressed with her integrity and willingness to lose everything to protect
the investing public have convinced Ms. Harrington that she should
manage their investments. As such, Noreen Harrington created her own
investment fund. She operates it with integrity and transparency. Ms.
Harrington's investment fund's governance matrix utilizes a best
practices model. The model confirms that money can be made without
defrauding the public or compromising the integrity of the American
financial and securities markets, which in turn stabilizes the global
economy.
Notes & Observations
